Coordination of contexts and taste disagreements

David Bordonaba Plou

doi:10.6018/daimon.332591

Autores/as

David Bordonaba Plou Universidad de Granada https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0788-9733

DOI: https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.332591

Palabras clave: Disagreement about taste, disagreement kinematics, non-straightforwardly factual disagreements, coordination of contexts, retraction

Resumen

In this paper, I will defend that there is an asymmetry between straightforwardly factual and non-straightforwardly factual disagreements (Field 2009) in terms of persistency and retraction, and that we can use what I will call coordination of contexts to explain these two asymmetries. To make my point I will focus on the kinematics of this type of disagreements. I will argue that one way to give a proper account of the kinematics of disagreements about taste and to discriminate between these two cases of disagreement is to focus on coordination of contexts.

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Biografía del autor/a

David Bordonaba Plou, Universidad de Granada

Contratado post-doctoral en el Departamento de Filosofía I de la Universidad de Granada, adscrito a la beca Leonardo Desacuerdos y Polarización de Actitudes.

Citas

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