Coordination of contexts and taste disagreements

Autor/innen

DOI: https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.332591
Schlagworte: Disagreement about taste, disagreement kinematics, non-straightforwardly factual disagreements, coordination of contexts, retraction

Abstract

In this paper, I will defend that there is an asymmetry between straightforwardly factual and non-straightforwardly factual disagreements (Field 2009) in terms of persistency and retraction, and that we can use what I will call coordination of contexts to explain these two asymmetries. To make my point I will focus on the kinematics of this type of disagreements. I will argue that one way to give a proper account of the kinematics of disagreements about taste and to discriminate between these two cases of disagreement is to focus on coordination of contexts.

Downloads

Keine Nutzungsdaten vorhanden.

Autor/innen-Biografie

David Bordonaba Plou, Universidad de Granada

Contratado post-doctoral en el Departamento de Filosofía I de la Universidad de Granada, adscrito a la beca Leonardo Desacuerdos y Polarización de Actitudes.

Literaturhinweise

BLOME-TILLMANN, Michael (2014): Knowledge and presuppositions, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

FIELD, Hartry (2009): «Epistemology without metaphysics», Philosophical Studies, nº 143, pp. 249-290.

GLANZBERG, Michael (2007): «Context, content, and relativism», Philosophical Studies, nº 136(1), pp. 1-29.

HUME, David (1826): «Of the standard of taste», in The philosophical works of David Hume, vol. 3, A. Black and W. Tait, Edinburgh, pp. 256-282.

HUVENES, Torfinn T. (2012): «Varieties of disagreement and predicates of taste», Australasian Journal of Philosophy, nº 90(1), pp. 167-181.

HUVENES, Torfinn T. (2014): «Disagreement without error», Erkenntnis, nº 79, pp. 143-154.

LASERSOHN, Peter (2005): «Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal taste», Linguistics and Philosophy, nº 28, pp. 643-686.

LEWIS, David (1979): «Scorekeeping in a language game», Journal of Philosophical Logic, nº 8(1), pp. 339-359.

LÓPEZ DE SA, Dan (2015): «Expressing disagreement: a presuppositional indexical contextualist relativist account», Erkenntnis, nº 80, pp. 153-165.

MACFARLANE, John (2007): «Relativism and disagreement», Philosophical Studies, nº 132(1), pp. 17-31.

MACFARLANE, John (2014): Assessment-sensitivity: Relative truth and its applications, Oxford University Press, New York.

MARQUES, Teresa (2015): «Disagreeing in context», Frontiers in Psychology, nº 6, pp. 1-12.

MESKIN, Aron & ROBSON, Jon (2015): «Taste and acquaintance», The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, nº 73(2), pp. 127-139.

RECANATI, Francois (2004): Literal meaning, Cambridge University Press, New York.

SCHAFFER, Jonathan (2011): «Perspective in taste predicates and epistemic modals», in: A. Egan and B. Weatherson (eds.): Epistemic modality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 179-226.

SMITH, Barry C. (2007): «The objectivity of tastes and tasting», in: B. C. Smith (ed.): Questions of taste: The philosophy of wine, Signal Books Limited, Oxford, pp. 61-101.

SMITH, Barry C. (2010): «Relativism, disagreement and predicates of personal taste», in: F. Recanati, I. Stojanovic & N. Villanueva (eds.): Context-dependence, perspective and relativity, Mouton de Gruyter, Göttingen, pp. 195-224.

STEVENSON, Charles L. (1944/1960): Ethics and language, Yale University Press, New Haven.

STOJANOVIC, Isidora (2007): «Talking about taste: Disagreement, implicit arguments, and relative truth», Linguistics and philosophy, nº 30(6), pp. 691-706.

SUNDELL, Timothy (2011): «Disagreements about taste», Philosophical Studies, nº 155(2), pp. 267-288.

Veröffentlicht
21-03-2020
Zitationsvorschlag
Bordonaba Plou, D. (2020). Coordination of contexts and taste disagreements. Daimon, (80), 169–184. https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.332591
Ausgabe
Rubrik
Artículos