On testimonial justice online. Nuancing Karen Frost-Arnold's optimistic virtue epistemology

Gonzalo Velasco Arias

doi:10.6018/daimon.612021

Autori

Gonzalo Velasco Arias Universidad Carlos III de Madrid https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9584-5051

DOI: https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.612021

Parole chiave: epistemology of virtue, deference, lurkers, humility, online testimony, trust

Agenzie di supporto

Fundación BBVA
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación

Abstract

In What Should We Be Online, Karen Frost-Arnold advocates an approach to epistemic virtues that resists pessimism about the possibility of our online epistemic agency being responsible and socially just. On the basis of a veritist epistemology, her proposal overcomes both responsibilist individualism and the socio-structural critique that delegates all responsibility to institutional transformations. The author identifies in online lurking an activity unique to online epistemic agency that can provide exposure to messages from people discriminated against by epistemic injustices. For Frost-Arnold, moreover, this implies the possibility of the lurker experiencing epistemic frictions that will favour a more reliable willingness to be fair in giving credit to the testimonies of those discriminated against. In this note I will qualify this optimistic stance, arguing the epistemic individualism that underlies it. I will point to a group virtue model as a possible solution.

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