What about my true beliefs? On the construction of our collective memory online

Autori

DOI: https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.610871
Parole chiave: Memoria colectiva, fake news, saber-cómo, conocimiento por familiaridad, epistemología de internet

Abstract

Aplicando la noción de 'memoria colectiva' de Mills, Frost-Arnold argumenta que un exceso de creencias falsas en línea (fake news) puede condicionar la memoria que compartimos como colectivo. Aquí sugiero, siguiendo la caracterización original de ‘ignorancia’ de Mill, que la construcción y mantenimiento de nuestra memoria colectiva también es vulnerable a cierta falta o ausencia total de creencias verdaderas en línea. Propongo que debemos investigar estas creencias atendiendo a dos cuestiones: en primer lugar, a instancias de conocimiento que están subrepresentadas y, en segundo lugar, a formas no proposicionales de conocimiento. El primer problema se aborda en la sección 1, donde exploro diferentes formas en las que algunas creencias pueden no alcanzar el ámbito digital debido a su estatus minoritario. El segundo problema es el foco de atención en la sección 2, donde se consideran formas no dominantes de conocimiento: el saber-cómo y el conocimiento por familiaridad.

By applying Mills’ notion of ‘collective memory’, Frost-Arnold argues that an excessive number of false beliefs online (fake news) can condition the memory that we share as a collective. Here I suggest, following Mill’s original characterization of ‘ignorance’, that the construction and maintenance of our collective memory is also vulnerable to some lack of or total absence of true beliefs online. I suggest we must investigate these beliefs attending to two issues: firstly, instances of knowledge that are underrepresented, and secondly, non-propositional forms of knowledge. The first problem is addressed in section 1, where I explore different ways in which some beliefs might not reach the online sphere, due to their minoritarian status. The second problem is my focus on section 2, which entails the consideration of non-dominant forms of knowledge: knowledge-how and knowledge by acquaintance.

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Pubblicato
01-09-2024
Come citare
Medina Vizuete, L. (2024). What about my true beliefs? On the construction of our collective memory online. Daimon, (93), 161–168. https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.610871
Fascicolo
Sezione
MONOGRÁFICO sobre «Diversidad y deliberación en entornos digitales». Simposio sobre Who Should We be Online (OUP, 2023) de Karen Frost-Arnold