What about my true beliefs? On the construction of our collective memory online
Abstract
By applying Mills’ notion of ‘collective memory’, Frost-Arnold argues that an excessive number of false beliefs online (fake news) can condition the memory that we share as a collective. Here I suggest, following Mill’s original characterization of ‘ignorance’, that the construction and maintenance of our collective memory is also vulnerable to some lack of or total absence of true beliefs online. I suggest we must investigate these beliefs attending to two issues: firstly, instances of knowledge that are underrepresented, and secondly, non-propositional forms of knowledge. The first problem is addressed in section 1, where I explore different ways in which some beliefs might not reach the online sphere, due to their minoritarian status. The second problem is my focus on section 2, which entails the consideration of non-dominant forms of knowledge: knowledge-how and knowledge by acquaintance.
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