El dinamismo de la intencionalidad colectiva y su fundación en la perspectiva de segunda persona como cuerpo extendido: revisitando a Husserl

Ivana María Anton Mlinar

doi:10.6018/daimon.521311

Authors

Ivana María Anton Mlinar Universidad Nacional de Cuyo https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6384-1913

DOI: https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.521311

Keywords: collective intentionality, social ontology, phenomenology, second-person perspective, extended body

Abstract

Phenomenological approaches to intersubjectivity show that individuals are both "constituent" and "constituted" by their mutual recognition as intentional agents, giving rise to the ability to integrate a collective intentionality. Reviews of the Husserlian contribution in the context of contemporary studies of social ontology have revealed the newfangled input of his multi-layered description of communalization to explain the social integration of individuals. Starting from this dynamic, this article aims, on the one hand, to show the second-person perspective as enabling an interpersonal self-awareness that gives rise to an extended body, from which the sense of the peculiar perspectivity of a collective intentionality can be understood. On the other hand, it aims to investigate, consequently, if it is possible to recognize a collective sense of ownership and agency.

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