La base corpórea de nuestros estados mentales:  corporeidad basal y relacional

Rafa Castro

doi:10.6018/daimon.494161

Authors

Rafa Castro UGR https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4496-5202

DOI: https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.494161

Keywords: embodiment, primary metaphors, image schemas, cognitive metaphor

Supporting Agencies

Formo parte del LICLE (Laboratorio de Investigación en Complejidad y de Lingüística Experimental)

Abstract

In the present work, we propose distinguishing between two embodied theories within the cognitive approach to metaphor: basal and relational embodiment. Basal embodiment is a theory that works with what the cognitive theory of metaphor called “bodily basis”. Our bodily basis, made up of image schemas and primary metaphors, is the set of near-universal mental states whose origin is due to a direct relation with embodied experience. On the contrary, relational embodiment aims to elucidate the mechanisms of composition and projection that secure a causal chain from our bodily basis to the rest of our mental states. Moreover, we examine in detail both theories through the analysis of the bodily basis, a key component for the development of basal and relational embodiment.

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