RAZONES DE LA MORAL Y EXIGENCIAS DE LA VIDA: KANT CONTRA NIETZSCHE

Abstract

The rejection of Nietzsche to the kantian moral universalism is because it reduces the essence of the man to the gregarious and nihilistic type which impedes the progress toward the superman. For that reason he opposes to Kant an «inmorality» of the singularity whose virtues are in harmony with the mobile character of the life. «Inmorality» doesn’t mean, therefore, negation of any moral, but rather morality as aesthetics, that is, genealogical reduction of the morals to the aesthetic statement for opposition to the categorical imperative. Nevertheless, what distances and distinguishes more than anything to these two moral proposals is their different option, the one for the security, the other one for the risk. Risk and security are the expression of two opposed genealogies: they come from two different human types and they produce diferent forms of humanity.