¿CONSISTE EN ALGO SER UNA Y LA MISMA PERSONA?

Abstract

Although the problem of personal identity is old, some present-day approaches to solve it are new; among them stand out the so called causal link theories. Such theories are a modification of the psychological theory of personal identity, that goes back to Locke, and that for rather long time had apparently been the standard theory. In what follows; 1) we will survey a couple of versions of the causal theory of identity, though for better understanding we will begin by regarding in what modifies it the traditional psychological theory, and wil also make some reference to the physicalist theories of pesonal identity; 2) we wil expound the theory of personal identity as something basic and non-reductible, as an alternative to the former; 3) we will analyze some examples designed to discern between rival theories; and 4) we will conclude claiming that, since causal theories fail, either non-reductionist theory should be seriously taken into account, or the answer should be looked for elsewhere.