La base corpórea de nuestros estados mentales:  corporeidad basal y relacional

Rafa Castro

doi:10.6018/daimon.494161

Autori

Rafa Castro UGR https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4496-5202

DOI: https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.494161

Parole chiave: corporeidad, metáforas primarias, imágenes esquema, metáfora cognitiva

Agenzie di supporto

Formo parte del LICLE (Laboratorio de Investigación en Complejidad y de Lingüística Experimental)

Abstract

Resumen: En el presente estudio proponemos distinguir dos teorías corpóreas dentro de la enfoque cognitivo de la metáfora: la corporeidad basal y relacional. La corporeidad basal es una teoría que trabaja con lo que la teoría cognitiva de la metáfora ha denominado “base corpórea”. La base corpórea, compuesta por las imágenes esquema y las metáforas primarias, es el conjunto de estados mentales prácticamente universales cuyo origen se debe a una relación directa con la experiencia corpórea. Al contrario, la corporeidad relacional pretende elucidar los mecanismos de composición y proyección que aseguran una cadena causal desde la base corpórea hasta el resto de estados mentales. Asimismo, examinaremos con mayor detalle ambas teorías mediante el análisis de la base corpórea, noción crucial para el desarrollo de la corporeidad basal y relacional.

Abstract: In the present work, we propose distinguishing between two embodied theories within the cognitive approach to metaphor: basal and relational embodiment. Basal embodiment is a theory that works with what the cognitive theory of metaphor called “bodily basis”. Our bodily basis, made up of image schemas and primary metaphors, is the set of near-universal mental states whose origin is due to a direct relation with embodied experience. On the contrary, relational embodiment aims to elucidate the mechanisms of composition and projection that secure a causal chain from our bodily basis to the rest of our mental states. Moreover, we examine in detail both theories through the analysis of the bodily basis, a key component for the development of basal and relational embodiment.

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