Gobierno corporativo y calidad de la información contable: Evidencia empírica española
Corporate governance and earnings quality evicence from spanish companies
Agencias de apoyo
- Agradecemos los comentarios de los dos evaluadores anónimos, cuyas sugerencias e indicaciones han contribuido a enriquecer el contenido de nuestro trabajo. Los errores subsistentes son de nuestra exclusiva responsabilidad.
Resumen
En el presente trabajo analizamos empíricamente los efectos de las actividades de Gobierno Corporativo sobre la calidad del resultado de las compañías cotizadas en el mercado español de capitales. Nuestros resultados han puesto de manifiesto una moderada influencia de las tareas desempeñadas por el grado de actividad del Consejo de Administración, que guarda una relación positiva y significativa con la calidad del resultado, pero no su tamaño y composición. Con relación al Comité de Auditoría, ninguna de las variables ha resultado ser estadísticamente significativa, y con respecto a la participación del equipo directivo en la propiedad de la firma, los resultados obtenidos indican cómo moderados niveles de propiedad gerencial aportan un efecto benéfico sobre la calidad contable, si bien a medida que su participación se eleva el efecto se invierte y se hace adverso. También hemos mostrado cómo la presencia de las familias fundadoras en el capital favorece la calidad contable, sin que hayamos obtenido evidencia de efecto alguno de la participación de tenedores de bloques significativos.
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