Información Contable y Gobierno Corporativo
Accounting Infonnation and Corporate Governance
Resumen
El presente trabajo tiene por objeto analizar la relación existente entre Gobierno Corporativo y Contabilidad, desde la idea básica es que la información contable es en sí mismo un producto de la actividad de gobierno, pero al mismo tiempo constituye un input de ésta, al alimentar dicho proceso. Delimitamos el marco teórico de la relación entre Gobierno Corporativo e información contable, identificamos el origen de las imperfecciones existentes y discutimos el papel que pueden desempeñar los incentivos y la monitorización eficiente para mitigar aquéllas, entre las que se encuentran los comités de auditora. Seguidamente examinamos la literatura más relevante sobre la cuestión y damos a conocer nuestra opinión sobre aquellos aspectos metodológicos que revisten mayor interés, así como algunas sugerencias para investigaciones futuras.
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