GLENNAN, Stuart (2017): The New Mechanical Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Autori

  • Saúl Pérez-González Universitat de València
DOI: https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon/308421
Parole chiave: mechanisim, explanation, causation

Agenzie di supporto

  • Ministerio español de Educación
  • Cultura y Deporte

Abstract

Reseña de: 

GLENNAN, Stuart (2017): The New Mechanical Philosophy. Oxford, Reino Unido: Oxford University Press.

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Biografia autore

Saúl Pérez-González, Universitat de València

Departamento de Filosofía

Riferimenti bibliografici

Glennan, S. S. (1996), «Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation», Erkenntnis, nº 44, pp. 49-71.

Glennan, S. S. (2002), «Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation», Philosophy of Science, nº 69, pp. S342-S353.

Glennan, S. S. (2017), The New Mechanical Philosophy, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Illari, P. M., & Williamson, J. (2012), «What is a mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms across the sciences», European Journal of Philosophy of Science, nº 2, pp. 119-135.

Woodward, J. (2000), «Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences», British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, nº 51, pp. 197-254.

Pubblicato
06-06-2018
Come citare
Pérez-González, S. (2018). GLENNAN, Stuart (2017): The New Mechanical Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Daimon, (74), 227–230. https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon/308421
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