The ontological implications of neo-Fregeanism

Autori

  • María de Ponte Universidad de Sevilla
DOI: https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon/221831
Parole chiave: Platonism, logicism, implicit definitions, priority thesis, nominalism, maximalism, relativism

Agenzie di supporto

  • Ministerio de Economía y competitividad
  • Gobierno Vasco.

Abstract

Neo-Fregeanism is a combination of two ideas: logicism, according to which arithmetic can be derived from logic plus definitions, and Platonism, according to which there are mathematical objects (which are abstract). Neo-Fregeans propose a new interpretation of Frege’s principles of abstraction (mainly the so-called Hume’s Principle) and of the role of reconceptualization and implicit definition for the introduction of numbers into our ontology. I analyze the ontological implications of neo-Fregeanism, not only for mathematics, but for abstract entities in general. After briefly introducing some of the main elements of neo-Fregeanism, I present two possible readings of its ontological implications and I argue that none of them gives the desired results. 

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Biografia autore

María de Ponte, Universidad de Sevilla

Departamento de Filosofía, Lógica y Filosofía de la CIencia
Pubblicato
15-09-2016
Come citare
de Ponte, M. (2016). The ontological implications of neo-Fregeanism. Daimon, (69), 159–174. https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon/221831
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