ALGUNAS REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERPRETACIÓN DE B. STROUD DE LOS ARGUMENTOS ANTIESCÉPTICOS KANTIANOS

Abstract

In his work "Kant and Skepticism", B. Stroud analyses the way in which trascnedental idealism is incompatible with Descartes' skeptical position. The "Copernican revolution" enables us to remove the "scandal to philosophy" posed by the problem of our knowledge of the esternal world. The objects around us in space are dependent on our sensibility and our understanding and it is only because that is true that we can perceive those objects directly and therefore can be noninferentially certain of their reality. Although I agree with this view, I try to demonstrate in my paper that those aspects of the kantian theory that Stroud emphasizes are not sufficent to refute Cartesian skepticism. The author ignores som thesis of Kant's doctrine of temporality that are required for establishing that inner experience depends on outer experience, and that there cannot be, therefore, a systematic delusion or a permanent dream.