On upholding empirical evidence. McIntyre in The Scientific Attitude

Authors

DOI: https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.436061
Keywords: Scientific Attitude, Empirical Evidence, Demarcation, Negationism, Post-truth, McIntyre

Abstract

Not long ago, demarcation, theory change and scientific rationality used to clutter up debates on the philosophy of science. These issues are now seen as the classical subjects of the discipline. In The Scientific Attitude, Lee McIntyre revamps the philosophical showcase by taking over the demarcation problem by asserting that “what is distinctive about science is that it cares about evidence and is willing to change its theories on the basis of evidence”. I hereby synthetize his proposal and offer five objections.

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References

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Published
01-01-2021
How to Cite
Sanjuan, M. (2021). On upholding empirical evidence. McIntyre in The Scientific Attitude. Daimon Revista Internacional de Filosofia, (82), 189–195. https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.436061
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Notas críticas