Deduction and new knowledge: a scientifically informed proposal to face the paradox of inference
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- Este artículo es producto derivado de la investigación posdoctoral realizada con el apoyo de la beca de Estancias Posdoctorales por México de CONACYT.
Abstract
In deduction the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion because the conclusion is contained in the premises; because of that many philosophers have denied the possibility of gaining knowledge through deduction or through deductive reasoning, which leads to a problem known as the paradox of inference. To address this problem, I propose a distinction between deductive reasoning as a cognitive process capable of generating new knowledge, and implication as a logical relation between propositions, which accounts for deduction’s validity, and I present scientific evidence to underpin this proposal.
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