Géneros naturales y definición de vida
A critical view of the metaphysical perspective of life
Abstract
In the contemporary philosophy of biology, some authors claim that life is better undertood as a natural kind (Cleland and Chyba 2002, Diéguez 2013). This paper questions the metaphysical commitments related to the natural kind approach in relation with the debate of defining life. The goal of this paper is to show how considering life as a natural kind carries out some difficulties and costs. Those difficulties have been partialy shown by Bich and Green (2018) concerning the essentialist view of natural kinds. In this paper we extended this criticism to other ways of understanding natural kinds and we argue that such a difficulties are due to the acceptance of an inadequate frame of reference, based on a naïve idea of naturalness and on a natural/conventional dichotomy that is not properly justified.
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