DE LA TRASCENDENCIA DEL EGO AL EGO TRASCENDENTAL

Abstract

The following text is a critic about the Jean-Paul Sartre’s ontology. This critic is structured from two different perspectives: 1) Sartre is using a biased interpretation (therefore a wrong interpretation) of the Husserl’s phenomenology to create a subject owner of a very questionable liberty. 2) The ontology which Sartre’s philosophy is based on, is untenable. From these two points of view we will examinate the rejection of the phenomenological conception of a pure I that Sartre manifests in his book La trascendance de l´Ego. Also we’ll explain why Sartre comes away from the Husserl of Ideas, presenting his fundamental thesis, consisting of showing, on the one hand, the dangers containing in a transcendental I holder of absolute protagonist, considerated the only subject of the conscience; on the other hand how, by virtue of this I, the experience, which was current and spontaneous (as for immanent) and is giving in the intensional act, is turning secondary, showing like a consequence of a primordial, and lasting I (in other words, not current).