VÉRTIGO Y EQUILIBRIO: LOS SENDEROS DEL ESCEPTICISMO

Abstract

Scepticism about knowledge, which is the main subject of this paper, has at its basis consideration of possibilities that we are not in a position to rule out and that are nonetheless incompatible with the truth of our beliefs. This basis is part and parcel of our everyday concept of knowledge, not something that adds to it from outside, so that the sceptical seeds root in nearby and familiar soil. After presenting and discussing classical sceptical arguments and putting to light their common structure, we deal with a recent response to scepticism, namely contextualism. According to contextualists, and contrary to the sceptic’s view, ordinary ascriptions of knowledge do not require excluding any possibilities incompatible with the truth of our beliefs. In holding this view, the sceptic gives a new meaning to such terms as «knowledge» or «knowing», but does not actually succeed in questioning the truth of those ordinary ascriptions. We conclude, however, that, in spite of its attractive features, contextualism is not powerful enough to dispel sceptical doubts.