CENESTESIA Y CUERPO VIVIDO. ¿POR QUÉ MARCEL ABANDONÓ SUS PRIMERAS FORMULACIONES SOBRE EL CUERPO SUJETO?

Abstract

There is no doubt on Marcel’s contribution to the arousal of the lived body as a new subject in the twentieth century’s philosophy. His influence on Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur’s developments is decisive. In his earlier formulations, Marcel introduced the notion of body-subject as identical with the body such as it is felt in coenaesthesic perception and in opposition to the body such as it is felt in external perception. And most of his scholars have followed the same path. Against this approach, the paper explains through historical as well as systematic reasons, coming from phenomenology and also from Wittgensteinian philosophy of mind, why Marcel should give up the concept of «coenaesthesia» and why this way of approaching the body subject is a cul-de-sac. The remotion of the idea of coenaesthesia makes Marcel’s analyses on lived body clearer and more fruitful.