¿COMPARANDO QUÉ? LA "ENDEBLEZ METODOLÓGICA" DE LA ÉTICA SEGÚN W.V.QUINE Y SUS CRÍTICOS

Authors

  • Francisco Javier Rodríguez Alcázar
Keywords: ética, ciencia, epistemología, justificación, Quine, endeblez metodológica, escéptico

Abstract

W. V. Quine has claimed that ethics is methodologically «infirm» as compared to science. This thesis has been criticised by several authors (M. White, O. Flanagan, M. Moody-Adams), and supported, at last, by Roger Gibson. I maintain that the debate on Quine's metaethical views lacks a precise specification of the level in which the methodological comparison between science and ethics takes place, and that this fact renders the debate endless and rather fruitless. I claim that it is possible to distinguish, at least, two different levels where the comparison between science and ethics can possibly take place. I also claim that the choice among these levels depends on our answer to a prior question: why the epistemological comparison between science and ethics? My answer is: in order to know whether or not ethics can be defended from the sceptic as successfully as science. This entails that the right level for comparing science and ethics is that one where the most general features of justification in both disciplines are taken into account, a level where, I claim, there are no significant differences between them.

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Author Biography

Francisco Javier Rodríguez Alcázar

Universidad de Oxford
How to Cite
Rodríguez Alcázar, F. J. (1995). ¿COMPARANDO QUÉ? LA "ENDEBLEZ METODOLÓGICA" DE LA ÉTICA SEGÚN W.V.QUINE Y SUS CRÍTICOS. Daimon Revista Internacional de Filosofia, (10), 69–92. Retrieved from https://revistas.um.es/daimon/article/view/13521
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