Política y Gestión Financiera Municipal
Politics and Municipal Financial Management
Agencias de apoyo
- Este trabajo es parte de los proyectos de investigación 05785/PHCS/07 y SEJ 2007-67441/ECON, financiados por la Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia y el Ministerio de Ciencia e Investigación, respectivamente.
Resumen
La situación fiscal de los gobiernos locales es el resultado de diversas circunstancias políticas y económicas. Así, los factores socioeconómicos (la población y el nivel económico, entre otros) no son suficientes para explicar el comportamiento del sector público, sino que la estructura política juega también un papel destacado. Ello ha dado lugar a una línea de investigación que estudia el impacto del sistema político, los conflictos entre los órganos de decisión dentro de los gobiernos y las diferencias ideológicas en la gestión financiera de los mismos. Utilizando este enfoque, en este trabajo tratamos de evaluar la evolución a largo plazo de los gastos, impuestos y resultados presupuestarios en España, centrándonos en el impacto de la ideología y de la fortaleza política en las finanzas municipales. Además, y siguiendo la literatura existente, consideramos también el nivel económico y población como variables socioeconómicas relevantes. Concluimos que la gestión financiera municipal no depende del signo político (izquierda/derecha) o la fortaleza política del gobierno, mientras que el nivel económico y la población influyen positivamente en el total de gastos e impuestos. Finalmente, el resultado presupuestario es independiente de nuestras variables explicativas, lo que obedece principalmente al marco legal español sobre finanzas municipales.
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