¿Pueden los salarios y la reelección prevenir la corrupción política? Evidencia empírica

Can salaries and re-election prevent political corruption? An empirical evidence

  • Bernardino Benito Lopez Universidad de Murcia
  • María-Dolores Guillamón Universidad de Murcia
  • Ana María Ríos Centro Universitario de Defensa en la Academia de la Fuerza Aérea Española
  • Francisco Bastida Universidad de Murcia
Palabras clave: Salarios, Reelección, Políticos, Corrupción, Gobierno municipal

Resumen

Antecedentes y objetivos

Este artículo se centra principalmente en las decisiones que adoptan los políticos y que pueden afectar al nivel de corrupción municipal. Específicamente, se analiza si los impulsos que mueven a los políticos locales a corromperse están influidos por los salarios que reciben y/o su intención de presentarse a las próximas elecciones. Esta cuestión apenas se ha abordado empíricamente antes a nivel local.

Método y datos

Nuestra muestra comprende 358 municipios españoles de más de 20.000 habitantes durante el período 2004-2009. Utilizamos dos métodos diferentes de estimación: los mínimos cuadrados ordinarios y el modelo logit ordenado, para analizar la influencia en la corrupción de los salarios de los políticos y/o su intención de presentarse a la reelección. Utilizamos como medida de corrupción el total de casos de corrupción urbana (comunicados en la prensa en línea) en cada municipio durante este período.

Resultados

Se muestra que existe repercusión de los salarios y la reelección en la corrupción. En primer lugar, los salarios relativamente más altos no reducen los impulsos de los políticos a corromperse. En segundo lugar, cuando los políticos quieren ser reelegidos, la corrupción disminuye. También encontramos que el nivel de ingresos, la desigualdad en los ingresos, el nivel de educación, los ingresos urbanos municipales y la naturaleza turística del municipio afectan a la corrupción.

Conclusiones

Nuestros hallazgos sugieren que es necesario que los gobiernos locales presten especial atención a las normas relacionadas con la forma en que se fijan los salarios de los políticos y el límite en la duración de las restricciones.

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Biografía del autor/a

Bernardino Benito Lopez, Universidad de Murcia

Departamento de Contabilidad y Finanzas, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Campus Regional de Excelencia Internacional "Campus Mare Nostrum", Universidad de Murcia, 30100-Espinardo (Murcia), ESPAÑA

María-Dolores Guillamón, Universidad de Murcia

Departamento de Contabilidad y Finanzas, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Campus Regional de Excelencia Internacional "Campus Mare Nostrum", Universidad de Murcia, 30100-Espinardo (Murcia), ESPAÑA

Ana María Ríos, Centro Universitario de Defensa en la Academia de la Fuerza Aérea Española

Departamento de Economía y Ciencias Jurídicas, Centro Universitario de Defensa en la Academia de la Fuerza Aérea Española, MDE-UPCT, Santiago de la Ribera, Murcia, ESPAÑA

Francisco Bastida, Universidad de Murcia

Departamento de Contabilidad y Finanzas, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Campus Regional de Excelencia Internacional "Campus Mare Nostrum", Universidad de Murcia, 30100-Espinardo (Murcia), ESPAÑA

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Publicado
01-01-2018
Cómo citar
Benito Lopez, B., Guillamón, M.-D., Ríos, A. M., & Bastida, F. (2018). ¿Pueden los salarios y la reelección prevenir la corrupción política? Evidencia empírica. Revista De Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review, 21(1), 19-27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rcsar.2017.04.003
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