Comportamiento electoral y estabilidad presupuestaria

Voting behavior and budget stability

Palabras clave: Budgetary Stability Law, Electoral cycles, Local governments

Resumen

En este trabajo analizamos la influencia de la entrada en vigor de la Ley de Estabilidad Presupuestaria en los Ciclos Políticos Presupuestarios generados por los gobiernos locales españoles. En concreto, estudiamos si la evolución de la deuda, del déficit, del gasto de capital y del gasto corriente a lo largo del ciclo electoral se ha visto modificada tras la introducción de dicha ley. Para ello utilizamos una muestra formada por 132 municipios españoles con más de 50.000 habitantes (incluidas las capitales de provincia) durante el periodo 1995–2009. Nuestros resultados muestran que la Ley de Estabilidad Presupuestaria ha evitado la creación de Ciclos Políticos Presupuestarios en la deuda. Por el contrario, la aprobación de dicha ley no ha atenuado los incentivos de los políticos para manipular el déficit, el gasto de capital y el gasto corriente con la finalidad de permanecer en el poder, si bien sí que ha supuesto un cambio en la forma en la que los alcaldes manipulan estas variables a lo largo del ciclo electoral. Antes de la aprobación de la ley se observaban expansiones oportunistas tanto en el año preelectoral como en el electoral, mientras que tras la entrada en vigor de la misma los incrementos del déficit, del gasto de capital y del gasto corriente se concentran en el año en el que se celebran las elecciones.

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Biografía del autor/a

Cristina Vicente

 

 

Cristina Vicente

 

 

Ana María Rios

Assistant Profesor

Base Aérea de San Javier (Academia General del Aire)
C/ Coronel López Peña,s/n
C/ Coronel López Peña,s/n
30720
Santiago de la Ribera, San Javier
SPAIN

Maria-Dolores Guillamón

Lecturer

Campus de Espinardo
Facultad de Economía y Empresa
Facultad de Economía y Empresa
Murcia
30100
SPAIN

Citas

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Publicado
01-01-2013
Cómo citar
Vicente, C., Vicente, C., Rios, A., & Guillamón, M.-D. (2013). Comportamiento electoral y estabilidad presupuestaria. Revista De Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review, 16(1), 46-52. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1138-4891(13)70005-0
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