¿Se endeudan más los partidos progresistas? ciclo partidista vs. ciclo electoral

Do progressive goverments undertake different debt burdens? partisan vs. electoral cycles

Autores/as

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S1138-4891(11)70021-8
Palabras clave: public debt, electoral cycle, partisan cycle, local government, municipalities, fiscal illusion

Resumen

El nivel de endeudamiento público ha sido explicado mediante dos factores políticos, principalmente, la ideología progresista y el ciclo electoral. El objetivo de este trabajo es evidenciar como influyen ambos factores en el comportamiento de los municipios españoles en relación con la deuda que estos asumen dada su capacidad, y como este esfuerzo se ve influenciado por la interacción entre los ciclos partidista y electoral. Se han estimado diversos modelos de dependencia, mediante metodologías de datos de panel, a partir de una muestra integrada por las capitales de provincia y los municipios españoles con una población superior a 50.000 habitantes, incluyendo un total de 148 ayuntamientos. El ámbito temporal analizado es el correspondiente a los ejercicios 1988 a 2008, ambos inclusive. Los resultados ponen de manifiesto que durante el año electoral, los políticos se comportan de manera oportunista, lo que conlleva un importante incremento de la deuda pública en relación con los ingresos municipales, aunque los partidos de ideología progresista realizan un esfuerzo tres veces mayor que los conservadores. Además, los gobiernos locales conservadores tienden a atenuar significativamente este comportamiento en los años previos a los comicios, mientras que los partidos de izquierdas no. Igualmente, se ha observado que los ciclos partidista y electoral han sido mitigados desde 2002 con la entrada en vigor de la Ley de estabilidad presupuestaria que impuso límites al endeudamiento que pueden asumir las administraciones subnacionales. La evidencia empírica obtenida pone de manifiesto la necesidad de perfeccionar los mecanismos de control internos y externos con el objetivo de evitar la ruptura de la política de estabilidad y el riesgo de insostenibilidad de la deuda, logrando una mayor disciplina presupuestaria.

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Biografía del autor/a

GARCIA-SANCHEZ ISABEL-MARIA

 

CAMPUS MIGUEL DE UNAMUNO, EDIFICIO FES
SALAMANCA
37007
SPAIN

José Manuel Prado-Lorenzo

 


SPAIN

Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros

 

Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Campus Unamuno, FES
Salamanca
37007
SPAIN

Citas

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Publicado
01-01-2011
Cómo citar
ISABEL-MARIA, G.-S., Prado-Lorenzo, J., & Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B. (2011). ¿Se endeudan más los partidos progresistas? ciclo partidista vs. ciclo electoral: Do progressive goverments undertake different debt burdens? partisan vs. electoral cycles. Revista De Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review, 14(1), 29-57. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1138-4891(11)70021-8
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