Corrupción percibida tras las reformas de privatización: el papel moderador del buen gobierno

Corruption Perception following Privatization Reforms: The Moderating Role of Governance


Palabras clave: Privatización, Corrupción, Buen gobierno, Rendición de cuentas

Agencias de apoyo

  • We are grateful for the financial support received from the University of the Basque Country under Grant Consolidated Research Group EJ/GV: IT 897-16.


Este estudio analiza la corrupción percibida tras las reformas de privatización, teniendo en cuenta el papel del buen gobierno, en 22 países europeos entre 2002 y 2013. Un primer análisis inicial no revela cambios relevante en la corrupción percibida después de las reformas de privatización, pero estos resultados son moderados por la calidad del gobierno (governance). En general, los resultados empíricos sugieren que la corrupción es menor cuando el nivel de buen gobierno se incrementa, el cual afecta a la corrupción percibida después de que se llevan a cabo privatizaciones de empresas públicas. Concretamente, la rendición de cuentas, la efectividad del gobierno en la aplicación de políticas públicas, la calidad de la regulación, el Estado de Derecho, y los mecanismos de control de la corrupción son esenciales para su prevención tras las reformas de privatización.


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Cómo citar
Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B., & Peña-Miguel, N. (2020). Corrupción percibida tras las reformas de privatización: el papel moderador del buen gobierno: Corruption Perception following Privatization Reforms: The Moderating Role of Governance. Revista de Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review, 23(1), 127–137.