The resistanf effect of slurs: A nonpropositional, presuppositional account
Resumo
The aim of this paper is to account for the resistance to cancelation, rejection, and retraction exhibited by slurs. The kind of explanation we offer is a presuppositional one. Like the most recent presuppositional accounts, moreover, ours is a nonpropositional presuppositional proposal. Our view is that, to be felicitous, utterances of sentences featuring slurs require certain components to be part of the common ground, but these components are not propositions, but world-orderings.
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