Is doxastic artificial intelligence an epistemic peer?
Abstract
An epistemic disagreement occurs when two people, who consider themselves epistemic peers, hold different doxastic attitudes after assessing the same evidence. Given that some type of artificial intelligence reproduces doxastic attitudes, i.e., “doxastic artificial intelligence” (DAI), could it be claimed that It is an epistemic peer? If DAI fulfills the same conditions required of a person, then DAI is also an epistemic peer, and therefore one might have disagreements with it. Conditions are (1) evidential equality, (2) cognitive equality, and (3) situation of full disclosure. We are claiming that DAI fulfills both (1) and (2), so it could be considered an epistemic peer. However, it is in (3) that we discover that DAI is a machine for reproducing opinions generated from the statistical probability of its databases on human behavior and knowledge. We conclude that it could be considered as a weak epistemic authority because its efficiency, however DAI only has doxastic value, reason enough not to be considered as an epistemic peer.
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