Las cualidades secundarias y el valor epistémico de la experiencia estética

Abstract

Considering Aesthetics as linked to the appreciative nature of sensorial experience, this article uses the concept of intentionality of sen-sation to rescue Aesthetics from being confined into the scope of mere opinions. After introducing and defining the problem, the text focuses on the so– called secondary qualities, immediate object of the sensation. The hypothesis is that the weak epistemic content attributed to secondary qualities throughout history is responsible for the difficult assessment of aesthetic judgment. A reformula-tion of the kind of news we receive from these qualities is proposed reviewing John McDowell and Crispin Wright review of Lockean’s secon-dary qualities, in dialogue with the Aristotelian theory of the proper sensible. The result of this review should influence the role we attribute, within the spectrum of disciplines, to Aesthetics and, secondarily, to Art.