LA LÓGICA DE LA IDENTIDAD EN G. FREGE

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show that Frege's concept of identity is closer to the relative identity thesis, than to a merely referencialist analysis based on the classical thesis of (absolute) identity. The reason is that according to fregean analysis is possible to formulate a right relation between the sense, the identity criterium and the information we get from a non-trivial identity statement. So, following Frege, we can coherently mantain Leibniz's Law. And, according to the thesis of absolute identity, this law is the necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of an identity statement. But, as a previous condition to the application of that law, we have to take into account an identity criterium that, as a component of the sense of terms, points out which kind of things we are identifying. This would be close to the requirements of relative identity thesis, althogh this thesis implies that different identity criteria bring with them different identity relations.