• Justus Hartnack


The article distinguishes between the concept of doing and the concept of an act. An act is performed, and it is performed by doing something: I am stealing another person´s purse by putting my hand into his pocket. I can do something and thereby perform an act but I can also do something without performing an act. I cannot perform act, however, without doing something. It is shown that it is logically impossible to reach a definition of the concept of an act: There is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an activity to be classified as an act. The solution to be problem is to see the connection between the concept of an act and the concept of responsibility. And, like the concept of an act, the concept of responsibility is indefinable. The concept of responsibility (and therefore also the concept of an act) can be understood only as a trouser-word (as propounded by Austin) and validated only by not being defeated (as propounded by H.L.A. Hart).


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Cómo citar
Hartnack, J. (1991). THE LOGIC OF THE CONCEPT OF ACTS. Daimon Revista Internacional de Filosofia, (3), 51–56. Recuperado a partir de