ON MEANING AS USE AND THE INSCRUTABILITY OF REFERENCE

  • David Checkland

Resumen

In this paper I argue that there are two strands at work in Wittgenstein´s rejection of the idea of the "Logically proper name" and its associated doctrine, ostensive definition. The first strand is a certain holism presupposed by both intentions to mean (Meinen) and meaning (Bedeutung). The second strand is the idea that the way a word or sentence is used- its point or role in the lives of its users- is internal to meaning, and not some additional or optional feature. These strands are parallelled in Davidson´s doctrine of the inscrutability of reference by the idea that reference is a theoretical posit needed to apply a holistic theory of meaning, and that assignments of reference are also determined holistically, as is the role of casuality.

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Biografía del autor/a

David Checkland
University of Toronto
Cómo citar
Checkland, D. (1). ON MEANING AS USE AND THE INSCRUTABILITY OF REFERENCE. Daimon Revista Internacional De Filosofia, (2), 71-85. Recuperado a partir de https://revistas.um.es/daimon/article/view/8601