Crusius and the Pre-critical Kant on the Principle of Determining Reason and the Ontological Argument
Abstract
In his version of the so-called Thomistic objection against the ontological argument, Kant follows Crusius in replacing the term “sufficient” for “determining” in the formulation ‛principle of reason’ as an attempt to distinguish logical possibility from real possibility more clearly. However, their respective reformulations of this principle and the Thomistic objection present some significant differences. In this paper, I will try to show two things: 1) The main differences between Crusius’ and Kant’s reformulation of the principle of determining reason. 2) The way in which these differences affect their respective formulations of the objection against the ontological argument.
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Riferimenti bibliografici
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