On the Intentionality of Shame and Pride
Supporting Agencies
- This work has been supported by the research projects PID2019-106420GA-I00 and PID2020-119588GB-I00 and by the grant BES-2017-081537 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and “ESF Investing in your future”.
Abstract
This paper argues against the widely held view according to which the main difference between shame and pride, and the rest of our emotions – such as fear, hate, surprise, joy or jealousy – is that the former are necessarily directed at the self as the intentional object of the emotion while the latter are typically oriented towards objects in the world other than the self. I examine three arguments in favour of this view and claim that further arguments should be provided in order to show that shame and pride are necessarily directed at oneself – the doer – rather than at an object different from the self – the deed.
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