How Should the Benefits and Burdens Arising from the Eurozone Be Distributed amongst Its Member States?

Josep Ferret Mas

doi:10.6018/daimon.488951

Autores/as

Josep Ferret Mas Universitat Pompeu Fabra - University of Reading

DOI: https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.488951

Palabras clave: Eurozona, Justicia distributiva, Igualitarismo, Autodeterminación colectiva

Agencias de apoyo

Leverhulme Trust Doctoral Scholar in Climate Justice, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading.

Resumen

This article asks how the costs and benefits of operating a monetary union should be distributed amongst its more and less competitive members, taking as an example the operation of the European Monetary Union (EMU or Eurozone). Drawing on existing domestic and transnational justice debates, I resist both a purely procedural and a purely distributive view. The former assumes treaties against a fair background can make any distribution fair and disregards how individual citizens are likely to fare depending on how a monetary union is organized. The latter requires justice amongst Eurozone co-citizens, and it neglects the value of member state’s choices and attitudes towards risk. Instead, I defend a view of the EMU as an association of free self-determining states. I also argue that a variety of factors are relevant to this problem, including the need to protect less competitive states from ‘domination’, or inappropriate forms of control by their co-members, and to protect citizens from various forms of deprivation even if their own governments are willing to expose them to the relevant risks.

Descargas

Los datos de descargas todavía no están disponibles.

Citas

Anderson, E. (1999). “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics: 287-337.

Beitz, Ch. (1979). Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bellamy, R. and Weale, A. (2015). “Political Legitimacy and European Monetary Union: Contracts, Constitutionalism and the Normative Logic of Two-Level Games”, Journal of European Public Policy, 257-274.

Besson, S. and Martí, J.L. (eds) (2009), Legal Republicanism: National and International. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bou-Habib, P. (2006). “Compulsory Insurance without Paternalism”, Utilitas, XXX.

Casal, P. (2007) “Why Sufficiency is Not Enough”, Ethics, XXXX

Thomas Christiano, “Climate Change and State Consent”, in Climate Change and Justice, Jeremy Moss ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 17-38.

Alexander Douglas, The Philosophy of Debt, (New York: Routledge, 2016).

Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Cambridge: The Belknapp Press of Harvard University Press, 1986).

Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

Ronald Dworkin, “Equality, Luck, and Hierarchy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, (2003): 190-198.

Jon Elster, “The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory”, in Thomas Christiano (ed.) Philosophy and Democracy, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2004): 138-160.

Aaron James, Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for the Global Economy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

Chandran Kukathas, “Welfare, Contract, and the Language of Charity,” The Philosophical Quarterly, (1989): 75-80.

Cécile Laborde, “Republicanism and Global Justice: A Sketch”, European Journal of Political Theory, (2010): 48-69.

Glyn Morgan, “European and Global Inequality,” in Ayelet Banai, Miriam Ronzoni, and Christian Schemmel C (eds) Social Justice, Global Dynamics: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, (New York: Routledge, 2011): 153–169.

Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, (2005): 113-147.

Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, (New York: Basic books, 1974).

Philip Pettit, “Freedom as Antipower”, Ethics 106(3), (1996): 576-604.

Miriam Ronzoni, “The Global Order: A Case of Background Injustice? A Practice-Dependent Account”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 37, no. 3, (2009): XXXXX,

Miriam Ronzoni, “Two Conceptions of State Sovereignty and their Implications for Global Institutional Design”, Critical Review of International and Social and Political Philosophy, (2012): XXX.

Andrea Sangiovianni, “Solidarity in the EU”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2013): 213–241.

T. M. Scanlon, “The Diversity of Objections to Inequality,” delivered as the Lindley Lecture at the University of Kansas (Lawrence, Kansas: 1996), reprinted in The Difficulty of Tolerance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 202-18.

Mathew Seligman, “Luck, Leverage, and Equality: A Bargaining Problem for Luck Egalitarians”, Philosophy & Public Affairs (2007): 266-292.

Seanna Schiffrin, “Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, (2000): XXXX.

Pavlina R. Tcherneva, “Money, Power, and Monetary Regimes”, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College working paper No. 861, (March 2016): 1-25.

Philippe Van Parijs, Just Democracy: The Rawls-Machiavelli Programme, (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2011). Philippe Van Parijs, “Demos-cracy for the Euroepan Union: why and how,” in Sophie Heine ed., Various Shades of Federalism: Which responses to the rise of populism and euroscepticism? Studia Diplomatica, (2014): 57 73. Philippe Van Parijs, “Epilogue: Justifying Europe,” in Philippe Van Parijs and Luuk Van Middelaar (eds), After the Storm: How to Save Democracy in Europe, (Brussels: Lannoo, 2015): 247–261.

Philippe Van Parijs, “No Eurozone without Eurodividend”, (Unpublished Manuscript, 2016 https://www.uclouvain.be/8609.html): 1-21

Juri Viehoff, “Maximum Convergence on a Just Minimum: A Pluralist Justification for European Social Policy,” European Journal of Political Theory, (2016): 1-24.

Jeremy Waldron, “John Rawls and the Social Minimum,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, (1986): 21-33.

Andrew Williams “Liberty, Equality, and Property” in John S Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 498-499.