Exactly Why Are Slurs Wrong?

Autores/as

DOI: https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.476391
Palabras clave: dignidad, daño, inmoralidad, insultos raciales, relacionalidad, slurs

Resumen

Este artículo busca proporcionar una descripción completa y fundamental de por qué los epítetos raciales y slurs similares son inmora-les, allá donde lo sean. Considera tres teorías prin-cipales, según las cuales, a grandes rasgos, son inmorales porque son dañinos (bienestarismo), porque socavan la autonomía (kantianismo) o porque son hostiles (un enfoque relacional poco discutido informado por ideas del Sur Glo-bal). Este artículo presenta nuevas objeciones a las dos primeras teorías y concluye a favor de la última justificación. Se muestra que considerar que los slurs son inmorales en la medida en que son hostiles captura las ventajas de las otras teo-rías evitando sus desventajas.

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Citas

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Publicado
07-09-2021
Cómo citar
Metz, T. (2021). Exactly Why Are Slurs Wrong? . Daimon Revista Internacional de Filosofia, (84). https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon.476391
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Sección
Monográfico sobre «Expressing Hatred: The Political Dimension of Expressives»