Investigación filosófica y emociones
La ontología histórica de Ian Hacking como alternativa
Resumen
Los estudios filosóficos sobre emociones se pueden dividir en dos grandes grupos: 1) aquellos que consideran que las emociones son naturales, resultado de nuestra evolución; 2) aquellos que, interesados en el pensamiento de autores concretos respecto a las emociones, no sostienen ninguna posición sustantiva acerca de ellas.
En este artículo exploramos una tercera opción: entender que las emociones son históricas, contextuales y socialmente definidas. Abrimos así la posibilidad a una nueva forma de investigación filosófica, que partiría de la ontología histórica del filósofo Ian Hacking como herramienta desde la que abordar el estudio filosófico de las emociones en la historia.
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