Relativism, Contextualism, and Temporal Perspective

Palabras clave: proposición, uso, evaluación, punto de vista del hablante, tiempo

Resumen

This article argues that there is no such thing as a proposition with variable truth-values, at least when considering English tensed sentences. This means that any account of meaning and truth that appeals to a notion of proposition with different truth-values at different times is necessarily at fault. The reason is that any evaluation context is always dominated by a temporal perspective beyond both speaker and audience and embedded to the communicational common ground. Only an approach that takes this into consideration is successful.

Citas

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Publicado
28-10-2018
Cómo citar
Colomina-Almiñana, J. (2018). Relativism, Contextualism, and Temporal Perspective. Daimon Revista Internacional De Filosofia, (75). https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon/332731
Sección
Perspectivismo en epistemología