Virtue Perspectivism, Normativity, and the Unity of Knowledge

  • Modesto Gómez Alonso Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca / University of Edinburgh
Palabras clave: Suerte coincidente, Perspectiva epistémica, Ernest Sosa, Adivinación, Conocimiento, Perspectivismo de virtudes

Resumen

It will be argued that personal agency, far from lacking epistemic value, contributes to knowledge in a substantial way. To this end, it will be claimed that what Sosa calls an epistemic perspective is necessary to solve the binding problem in epistemology at the three junctures at which it can occur: as the Pyrrhonian question of whether one can rationally endorse one’s epistemic rationality; as the problem of the epistemic status of guessing; and as the enquiry into the contribution of the agential perspective for evading coincidental luck. Our aim has been that of elucidating and expanding Sosa’s virtue perspectivism.

Referencias

Anscombe, E. (1979), «What is it to Believe Someone?», in: C.F. Delaney (ed.): Rationality and Religious Belief, South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 141-151.

Davidson, D. (2001), Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fichte, J.G. (2005), The System of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Frankfurt, H.G. (2006), Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Kornblith, H. (2012), On Reflection, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nozick, R. (1981), Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Sosa, E. (2007), A Virtue Epistemology. Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Sosa, E. (2011), Knowing Full Well, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Sosa, E. (2015), Judgment and Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sosa, E. (2017), Epistemology, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Sosa, E. (Forthcoming), «Replies to Comments on Judgment and Agency», Philosophical Studies, Forthcoming, pp. 1-13.

Yaffe, G. (2000), «Free Will and Agency at Its Best», Philosophical Perspectives, 14, pp. 203-229.

Publicado
28-10-2018
Cómo citar
Gómez Alonso, M. (2018). Virtue Perspectivism, Normativity, and the Unity of Knowledge. Daimon Revista Internacional De Filosofia, (75). https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon/328001
Sección
Perspectivismo en epistemología