The ontological implications of neo-Fregeanism

Autores/as

  • María de Ponte Universidad de Sevilla
DOI: https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon/221831
Palabras clave: Platonism, logicism, implicit definitions, priority thesis, nominalism, maximalism, relativism

Agencias de apoyo

  • Ministerio de Economía y competitividad
  • Gobierno Vasco.

Resumen

Neo-Fregeanism is a combination of two ideas: logicism, according to which arithmetic can be derived from logic plus definitions, and Platonism, according to which there are mathematical objects (which are abstract). Neo-Fregeans propose a new interpretation of Frege’s principles of abstraction (mainly the so-called Hume’s Principle) and of the role of reconceptualization and implicit definition for the introduction of numbers into our ontology. I analyze the ontological implications of neo-Fregeanism, not only for mathematics, but for abstract entities in general. After briefly introducing some of the main elements of neo-Fregeanism, I present two possible readings of its ontological implications and I argue that none of them gives the desired results. 

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Biografía del autor/a

María de Ponte, Universidad de Sevilla

Universidad de Sevilla
Publicado
15-09-2016
Cómo citar
de Ponte, M. (2016). The ontological implications of neo-Fregeanism. Daimon Revista Internacional de Filosofia, (69), 159–174. https://doi.org/10.6018/daimon/221831
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Artículos