Los derechos homínidos. Una defensa ecuménica

Paula Casal


Hay quien rechaza los derechos homínidos o simios afirmando que son fruto de una confusión conceptual. Sin embargo, aunque hay muchas disputas filosóficas acerca de si existen los derechos naturales o los derechos positivos, sobre la plausibilidad de las teorías del status y la elección, o sobre la concepción de los derechos como triunfos o constricciones, la opinión mayoritaria en todos esos debates es perfectamente compatible con el concepto de derechos simios. De hecho, los derechos homínidos pueden defenderse desde cualquier posición en esos debates e incluso desde cualquier combinación de posiciones en esos debates. Quienes están confundidos sobre los derechos son  quienes niegan esta compatibilidad.

Palabras clave

Derecho animal, derecho natural, teoría del status, teoría electiva de los derechos, derechos humanos.

Texto completo



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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon/217741

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