Grandes accionistas y costes de agencia de la deuda. El caso español

Large shareholders and agency costs of debt. Evidence from Spain

Autores/as

DOI: https://doi.org/10.6018/rcsar.480191
Palabras clave: Costes de agencia de la deuda, Condiciones de préstamo, Grandes accionistas

Agencias de apoyo

  • Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation via Projects MCI-20-PID2019-108503RB-I00 and PID2022-140940NB-I00
  • Government of the Principality of Asturias via project (GECOFIN) AYUD/2021/50878

Resumen

El objetivo del presente trabajo consiste en analizar la influencia que los grandes accionistas tienen sobre las condiciones de los préstamos bancarios para una muestra compuesta por 984 préstamos realizados a 261 empresas cotizadas y no cotizadas españolas no financieras durante el periodo 2001-2017. Los resultados muestran que la presencia de grandes accionistas incrementa el tipo de interés pagado por los préstamos en el caso de las empresas cotizadas, mientras el efecto no es significativo para las empresas no cotizadas. De forma similar, una distribución de la propiedad menos equilibrada entre los grandes accionistas está asociada con un mayor tipo de interés pagado por las empresas cotizadas. Los resultados ponen de manifiesto que los grandes accionistas expropian riqueza de otros inversores en las empresas cotizadas, en línea con la existencia de menores beneficios para los prestatarios de la existencia de grandes accionistas cuando disponen de otros mecanismos, tanto internos como externos, de control.

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Publicado
01-01-2024
Cómo citar
Álvarez-Botas, C., Fernández-Méndez, C., & González, V. M. (2024). Grandes accionistas y costes de agencia de la deuda. El caso español: Large shareholders and agency costs of debt. Evidence from Spain. Revista de Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review, 27(1), 92–109. https://doi.org/10.6018/rcsar.480191
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