Grandes accionistas y costes de agencia de la deuda. El caso español

Large shareholders and agency costs of debt. Evidence from Spain


Palabras clave: Costes de agencia de la deuda, Condiciones de préstamo, Grandes accionistas

Agencias de apoyo

  • Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation via Projects MCI-20-PID2019-108503RB-I00 and PID2022-140940NB-I00
  • Government of the Principality of Asturias via project (GECOFIN) AYUD/2021/50878


El objetivo del presente trabajo consiste en analizar la influencia que los grandes accionistas tienen sobre las condiciones de los préstamos bancarios para una muestra compuesta por 984 préstamos realizados a 261 empresas cotizadas y no cotizadas españolas no financieras durante el periodo 2001-2017. Los resultados muestran que la presencia de grandes accionistas incrementa el tipo de interés pagado por los préstamos en el caso de las empresas cotizadas, mientras el efecto no es significativo para las empresas no cotizadas. De forma similar, una distribución de la propiedad menos equilibrada entre los grandes accionistas está asociada con un mayor tipo de interés pagado por las empresas cotizadas. Los resultados ponen de manifiesto que los grandes accionistas expropian riqueza de otros inversores en las empresas cotizadas, en línea con la existencia de menores beneficios para los prestatarios de la existencia de grandes accionistas cuando disponen de otros mecanismos, tanto internos como externos, de control.


Los datos de descargas todavía no están disponibles.


Álvarez-Botas, C., Fernández-Méndez, C., & González, V. M. (2022). Large bank shareholders and terms of bank loans during the global financial crisis. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 33(1), 107-133.

Anderson, R.C., Mansi, S.A., & Reeb, D.M. (2003). Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 68, 263-285.

Aslan, H., & Kumar, P. (2012). Strategic ownership structure and the cost of debt. Review of Financial Studies, 25 (7), 2257-2299.

Attig, N., Guedhami, O., & Mishra, D. (2008). Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and implied cost of equity. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14, 721-737.

Badertscher, B.A., Givoly, D., Katz, S.P., & Lee, H. (2019). Private Ownership and the Cost of Public Debt: Evidence from the Bond Market. Management Science, 65 (1), 301-326.

Bae, K.H., & Goyal, V.K. (2009). Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Bank Loans. Journal of Finance, 64 (2), 823-860.

Basu, N., Paeglis, I., Rahnamaei, M. (2016). Multiple blockholders, power and firm value. Journal of Banking and Finance, 66, 66–78.

Becht, M., & Röell, A. (1999). Block holdings in Europe: an international comparison. European Economic Review, 43 (4-6), 1049-1056.

Bennedsen, M., & Wolfenzon, D. (2000). The balance of power in closely held corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 113-139.

Beuselinck, C., Cao, L., Deloof, M., & Xia, X. (2017). The value of government ownership during the global financial crisis. Journal of Corporate Finance, 42, 481-493.

Bhattacharya, P.S., & Graham, M. (2009). On institutional ownership and firm performance: A disaggregated view. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 19, 370-394.

Bhojraj, S., & Sengupta, P. (2003). Effect of corporate governance on bond ratings and yields: The role of institutional investors and outside directors. Journal of Business, 76, 455-475.

Borisova, G., Fotak, V., Holland, K., & Megginson, W.L. (2015). Government ownership and the cost of debt: Evidence from government investments in publicly traded firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 118 (1), 168-191.

Bozec, Y., & Bozec, R. (2007). Ownership concentration and corporate governance practices: substitution or expropriation effects? Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences/Revue Canadienne des Sciences de l'Administration, 24 (3), 182-195.

Chava, S., Livdan, D., & Purnanandam, A.K. (2009). Do shareholder rights affect the cost of bank loans? Review of Financial Studies, 22, 2973–3004.

Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L.H.P. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 81–112.

Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L.H.P. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance, 57, 2741-2771.

Cornett, M.M., Marcus, A.J., Saunders, A., Tehranian, H. (2007). The impact of institutional ownership on corporate operating performance. Journal of Banking and Finance, 31 (6), 1771–1794.

Davis, E. P., & Stone, M. R. (2004). Corporate financial structure and financial stability. Journal of Financial Stability, 1(1), 65-91.

de Guindos, L. (2020). Building the financial system of the 21st century. ECB Speech (22 July 2020). Accessed 22 October 2021.

Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2001). Financial structure and economic growth: A cross-country comparison of banks, markets, and development. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Ehrmann, M., Gambacorta, L., Martínez-Pagés, J., Sevestre, P., & Worms, A. (2003). Financial systems and the role of banks in monetary policy transmission in the euro area. In I. Angeloni, A. Kashyap, & B. Mojon (Eds.), Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area: A Study by the Eurosystem Monetary Transmission Network (pp. 235-269). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Faccio, M. (2006). Politically connected firms. American Economic Review, 96 (1), 369–386.

Faccio, M., Lang, L., & Young, L. (2001). Dividends and expropriation. American Economic Review, 91, 54-78.

Faccio, M., & Lang, L. H. P. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 65, 365–395.

Fernández-Mendez, C., & Arrondo-Garcia, R. (2005). Alternative internal controls as substitutes of the board of directors. Corporate governance: an international review, 13 (6), 856-866.

Fernández-Méndez, C., & González, V.M. (2019). Bank ownership, lending relationships and capital structure: Evidence from Spain. BRQ - Business Research Quarterly, 22 (2), 137-154.

Ferreira, M.A., & Matos, P. (2012). Universal banks and corporate control: Evidence from the global syndicated loan market. Review of Financial Studies, 25 (9), 2703-2744.

Graham, J. R., Li, S., & Qiu, J. (2008). Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting. Journal of Financial Economics, 89 (1), 44-61.

Holderness, C. (2009). The myth of diffuse ownership in the United States. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 1377-1408.

Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.

Jiang, W., Li, K., & Shao, P. (2010). When Shareholders Are Creditors: Effects of the Simultaneous Holding of Equity and Debt by Non-commercial Banking Institutions. Review of Financial Studies, 23 (10), 3595–3637.

Johnson, S., La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2000). Tunneling. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 90 (2), 22-27.

Khwaja, A.I., & Mian, A. (2005). Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120 (4), 1371–1411.

Laeven, L., & Levine, R. (2008). Complex ownership structures and corporate valuations. Review of Financial Studies, 21 (2), 579-604.

La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance, 54 (2), 471-518.

La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002). Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of Finance, 57 (3), 1147-1170.

Lin, C., Ma, Y., Malatesta, P., & Xuan, Y. (2011). Ownership structure and the cost of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 100 (1), 1-23.

Lins, K. (2003). Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 159-184.

Mangena, M., Priego, A.M., & Manzaneque, M. (2020). Bank power, block ownership, boards and financial distress likelihood: An investigation of Spanish listed firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 64, 101636.

Maury, B., & Pajuste, A. (2005). Multiple controlling shareholders and firm value. Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, 1813-1834.

Myers, S. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 147-175.

Pagano, M., Röell, A. (1998). The choice of stock ownership structure: agency costs, monitoring, and the decision to go public. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 187-225.

Petersen, M. A. (2009). Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches. Review of Financial Studies, 22 (1), 435–480.

Qian, J., & Strahan, P.E. (2007). How law and institutions shape financial contracts: The case of bank loans. Journal of Finance, 62, 2803-2834.

Rediker, K. J., & Seth, A. (1995). Boards of directors and substitution effects of alternative governance mechanisms. Strategic Management Journal, 16 (2), 85-99.

Roberts, G., & Yuan, L. (2010). Does institutional ownership affect the cost of bank borrowing? Journal of Economics and Business, 62, 604-626.

Sánchez-Ballesta, J.P., & García-Meca, E. (2011). Ownership Structure and the cost of debt. European Accounting Review, 20 (2), 389-416.

Saunders, A., & Steffen, S. (2011). The Costs of Being Private: Evidence from the Loan Market. Review of Financial Studies, 24 (12), 4091-4122.

Warga, A., & Welch, I. (1993). Bondholder losses in leveraged buyouts. Review of Financial Studies, 6 (4), 959-972.

Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal–principal perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45 (1), 196-220.

Cómo citar
Álvarez-Botas, C., Fernández-Méndez, C., & González, V. M. (2024). Grandes accionistas y costes de agencia de la deuda. El caso español: Large shareholders and agency costs of debt. Evidence from Spain. Revista de Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review, 27(1), 92–109.

Artículos similares

También puede {advancedSearchLink} para este artículo.