Can more able CEOs reduce the gap between internal and external CSR disclosures?
¿Pueden los consejeros delegados más capaces reducir la brecha entre la información interna y externa sobre RSE?
Supporting Agencies
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71972152)
- Social Science Foundation of Shaanxi Province of China (Grant No. 2022R029)
Abstract
This study examines the association between chief executive officer (CEO) ability and the gap between internal and external corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure. We find that a firm’s CSR disclosure gap decreases when its CEO's ability increases. We also find that this negative association is strengthened when a CEO has political connections and when a CEO is internally promoted (inside CEO). Our results are robust after controlling for firm fixed effect and addressing endogeneity concerns. Overall our findings are consistent with our argument that more able CEOs significantly reduce the CSR disclosure gap and maintain the positive relationship between internal and external stakeholders. These results carry substantial implications for both theory and practice. From a practical standpoint, our findings emphasize the pivotal role of capable CEOs in orchestrating consistent CSR narratives that resonate internally and externally. This study offers valuable insights for corporate leaders striving to enhance their firms' CSR transparency and maintain favourable stakeholder relationships.
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