Regulación, Supervisión y Conservadurismo Contable: La Interacción de los Tres Pilares de Basilea II con la Calidad de los Resultados Reportados en la Banca Mundial
Regulation, Supervision and Accounting Conservatism: The Interaction of the Three Pillars of Basel II on the Quality of Reported Earnings in Worldwide Banks
Resumen
El conservadurismo contable es una cualidad de las ganancias asociada positivamente con la solidez de la regulación y supervisión bancaria y también con la alta disciplina del mercado, pero aún queda la cuestión sin resolver de la forma en que estos tres pilares de Basilea II interactúan entre sí. Analizamos cómo los regímenes regulatorios y de supervisión en la industria bancaria interactúan claramente con las medidas de disciplina del mercado, como si cotizan o no, la distinta estructura de propiedad, la concentración del mercado y los requisitos de divulgación en una muestra de 14.651 observaciones de 54 países diferentes durante los diez años anteriores al fallo de Basilea II.
Según nuestros hallazgos, existe una clara correlación entre la fortaleza de la regulación y la supervisión bancaria y el nivel del conservadurismo contable en países donde la disciplina de mercado es débil. Es decir, el poder de supervisión refuerza el efecto del estatus de cotización, la propiedad y la concentración sobre el conservadurismo, mientras que el sistema de regulación de capital mitiga el efecto de la disciplina de mercado sobre el conservadurismo. También evidenciamos que, en un sistema regulatorio poderoso, más requisitos de divulgación están asociados con políticas menos conservadoras en las entidades financieras.
Los resultados obtenidos contribuyen al debate sobre si los fuertes incrementos en la regulación bancaria, y el mayor poder de supervisión introducidos en el mecanismo de Basilea III están justificados ante fallos en la disciplina de mercado introducida por Basilea II. La calidad del resultado contable se puede mejorar para prevenir quiebras bancarias mediante la aplicación de fuertes Pilares I y II, es decir, regulación y supervisión. Dicho esto, la disciplina del mercado sigue siendo un factor clave para lograr la estabilidad financiera, pero sigue sin ser el más relevante.
Descargas
Citas
Alali, F., & Jaggi, B. (2010). Earnings versus capital ratios management: role of bank types and SFAS 114. Review of Quantitative Finance Accounting, 36(1), 105-132. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-010-0173-4
Ahmed, A.S., & Duellman, S. (2007). Accounting characteristics and Board of Directors characteristics: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 43, 411-437. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.01.005
Ball, R., & Shivakumar, L. (2005). Earnings quality in UK private firms: Comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(1), 83-128. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.04.001
Barth, J.R., Caprio, G., & Levine, R. (2001). The regulation and supervision of banks around the world: A new database. World Bank Working Paper No. 2588. The updated version is available from http://econ.worldbank.org
Barth, J.R., Caprio, G., & Levine, R. (2004). Bank regulation and supervision: What works best? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13(2), 205-248. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2003.06.002
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G., & Levine, R. (2006). Rethinking bank regulation. Till angels govern. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Basu, S. (1997). The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(1), 3-37. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(97)00014-1
Beatty, A.L., & Harris, D.H. (1999). The effects of taxes, agency cost and information asymmetry on earnings management: A comparison of public and private firms. Review of Accounting Studies, 4, 299-326. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009642403312
Beatty, A. L., Ke, B., & Petroni, K. R. (2002). Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Declines across Publicly and Privately Held Banks. The Accounting Review, 77(3), 547-570. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3068887
Beatty, A., & Liao, S. (2011). Do delays in expected loss recognition affect banks' willingness to lend? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 52(1), 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.02.002
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A.M., & Maksimovic, V. (2004). Bank Competition and Access to Finance: International Evidence. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36, 627-648.
Berger, A. N., Clarke, G. R.G., Cull, R., Klapper, L., & Udell, G. F. (2005). Corporate governance and bank performance: A joint analysis of the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29(8-9), 2179-2221, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.03.013
Berger, A.N., Hasan, I., & Klapper, L.F. (2004). Further Evidence on the Link between Finance and Growth: An International Analysis of Community Banking and Economic Performance. Journal of Financial Services Research, 25, 169-202. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:FINA.0000020659.33510.b7
Bertrand, M., Schoar, A., & Thesmar, D. (2007). Banking deregulation and industry structure: Evidence from the French Banking Reforms of 1985. Journal of Finance, 62(2), 597-628. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01218.x
Bhat, V. N. (1996). Banks and income smoothing: an empirical analysis. Applied Financial Economics, 6(6), 505-510. https://doi.org/10.1080/096031096333953
Bikker, J.A., & Metzemakers, P.A.J. (2005). Bank provisioning behaviour and procyclicality. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 15(2), 141-157. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2004.03.004
Biurrun, V., & Rudolf, M. (2010). Mitigating Bank Earnings Management: The Role of Regulation and Supervision. Available at SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1600703
Bonito, A., & Pais, C. (2018). The macroeconomic determinants of the adoption of IFRS for SMEs. Revista de Contabilidad-Spanish Accounting Review, 21(2), 116-127. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rcsar.2018.03.001
Bouvatier, V., Lepetit, L., & Strobel, F. (2014). Bank income smoothing, ownership concentration and the regulatory environment. Journal of Banking and Finance, 41(1), 253-270. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.12.001
Bushman, R., & Williams, C. (2012). Accounting discretion, loan loss provisioning, and discipline of Banks' risk-taking. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 54(1), 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2012.04.002
Cabedo, J.D., & Tirado, J.M. (2016). Cantidad y calidad de información de riesgos divulgada por las empresas españolas: Un análisis en periodos diferentes del ciclo económico. Revista de Contabilidad-Spanish Accounting Review, 19 (2), 261-270. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rcsar.2016.05.001
Carbó, S., Humphrey, D., & Rodríguez, F. (2003). Bank deregulation is better than bank mergers. Journal of International Financial Institutions, Markets, and Money, 13(5), 429-449. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1042-4431(03)00017-9
Cetorelli, N., & Gambera, M. (2001). Banking market structure, financial dependence and growth: International evidence from industry data. Journal of Finance, 56(2), 617-648. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00339
Cetorelli, N., & Strahan, P. (2006). Finance as a barrier to entry: Bank competition and industry structure in local U.S. markets. Journal of Finance, 61(1), 437-461. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00841.x
Chhaochharia, V., Grullon, G., Grinstein, Y., & Michaely, R. (2012). Product market competition and agency conflicts: Evidence from the Sarbanes Oxley law. Johnson School Research Paper Series, (18-2012).
Clair, R.T. (1992). Loan growth and loan quality: Some preliminary evidence from Texas Banks. Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Third Quarter, 9-21.
Clarke, G., & Cull, R. (2002). Political and economic determinants of the likelihood of privatizing Argentine public banks. Journal of Law and Economics, 45(1), 165-97. https://doi.org/10.1086/324653
Curcio, D., De Simone, A., & Gallo, A. (2017). Financial crisis and international supervision: New evidence on the discretionary use of loan loss provisions at Euro Area commercial Banks. The Bristish Accounting Review, 49(2), 181-193. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2016.09.001
Curcio, D., & Hassan, I. (2015). Earnings and capital management and signaling: the use of loan-loss provisions by European banks. European Journal of Finance, 21(1), 26-50. https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2012.762408
Domikowsky, C., Duellmann, K., Bornemann, S., Pfingsten, A. (2014). Loan loss provisioning and procyclicality: evidence from an expected loss model. Discussion paper nº 39/2014. Deutsche Bundesbank.
Dinç, I. S. (2005). Politicians and banks: Political influences on government-owned banks in emerging markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 77(2), 453-479. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.011
El-Bannany, M. (2017). Factors influencing accounting conservatism in banks: the UAE case. Journal of Governance and Regulation, 6(2), 14-21. https://doi.org/10.22495/jgr_v6_i2_p2
El Sood, H.A. (2012). Loan loss provisioning and income smoothing in US banks pre and post the financial crisis. International Review of Financial Analysis, 25, 64-72. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2012.06.007
Fonseca, A., & González, F. (2008). Cross-country determinants of bank income smoothing by managing loan-loss provisions. Journal of Banking and Finance, 32(2), 217-228. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.02.012
García Osma, B., Mora, A., & Porcuna-Enguix, L. (2019). Prudential supervisors' independence and income smoothing in European banks, Journal of Banking and Finance, 102, 156-176. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.03.001
Giroud, X., & Mueller, H. (2010). Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries? Journal of Financial Economics, 95(3), 312-331. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.10.008
Givoly, D., Hayn, C., & Katz, S. (2010). Does Public Ownership of Equity Improve Earnings Quality? The Accounting Review, 85(1), 195-225. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2010.85.1.195
Ha, J., (2020). Bank Accounting Conservatism and Bank Loan Quality. Journal of Business, Finance & Accounting, 48 (2).
Ha, J. (2021). Bank accounting conservatism and bank loan quality, Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting, 48(3-4), 498-532. https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12484
Hau, H., & Thum, M. (2009). Subprime Crisis and Board (in-) Competence: Private versus Public Banks in Germany. Economic Policy, 24(60), 701-752. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40272535
Hou, K., & Robinson, D. (2006). Industry Concentration and Average Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance, 61(4), 1927-1956. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00893.x
Holmstrom, B. (1982). Moral Hazard in Teams. The Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), 324-340. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003457
Huang, W. (2021). Does banking deregulation affect accounting conservatism? Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 40(6), 106876. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2021.106876
International Accounting Standard Board (2014): 2014 International Financial Reporting Standards IFRS: Official Pronouncements Issued at 1 January 2014. London, UK: IFRS Foundation.
Illueca, M., Norden, L., & Udell, G. F. (2011). Liberalization, Bank Governance, and Risk Taking. EFA 2008 Athens Meetings Paper, AEA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1785793 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1785793
Illueca, M., Norden, L., & Udell, G., (2012). Do Changes in the Timeliness of Loan Loss Recognition Affect Bank Risk Taking? Available at: http://www.b.kobe-u.ac.jp/phd/files/sesami_20130329ud.pdf
Illueca, M., Norden, L., Pacelli, J., & Udell, G. F. (2020). Countercyclical Prudential Buffers and Bank Risk-taking. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2022644 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2022644
Jensen M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
Khan, M., & Watts, R. (2009). Estimation and empirical properties of a firm-year measure of accounting conservatism. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 48(2-3), 132-150. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.08.002
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002). Government Ownership of Banks. The Journal of Finance, 57(1), 265-301. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2697840
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2006). What Works in Securities Laws? The Journal of Finance, 61(1), 1-32. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00828.x
Laeven, L., & Levine, R. (2009): Bank Governance, Regulation and Risk Taking. Journal of Financial Economics, 93 (2), 259-275.
Laeven, L., & Majnoni, G. (2003). Loan Loss Provisioning and economic slowdowns: too much, too late? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 12, 178-197. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1042-9573(03)00016-0
Leventis, S., Dimitropoulos, P., & Owusu-Ansah, S. (2013). Corporate Governance and Accounting Conservatism: Evidence from the Banking Industry. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21(3), 264-286. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12015
Levine, R. (2002). Bank-based or market-based financial systems: Which is better? Working paper 9138. Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9138
Moyer, S. (1990). Capital adequacy ratio regulations and accounting choices in commercial banks. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 13(2), 123-154. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(90)90027-2
Nalebuff, B. J., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1983). Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition. The Bell Journal of Economics, 14(1), 21-43. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003535
Nichols, D., Wahlen, J., & Wieland, M. (2009). Publicly traded versus privately held: implications for conditional conservatism in bank accounting. Review of Accounting Studies, 14, 88-122. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-008-9082-3
Pereira, A., & Gaspar, M. (2017). Earnings management ans European Regulation 1606/2002: Evidence from non-financial Portuguese companies listed in Euronext. Revista de Contabilidad-Spanish Accounting Review, 20 (2), 107-117. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rcsar.2017.05.002
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (1995). The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(2), 407-443. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118445
Puri, M., Rocholl, J., & Steffe, S. (2011). Global Retail Lending in the Aftermath of the US Financial Crisis: Distinguishing between Demand and Supply Effects. Journal of Financial Economics, 100, 556-578. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.12.001
Salas, V., & Saurina, J. (2002). Credit risk in two institutional regimes: Spanish commercial and savings banks. Journal of Financial Services Research, 22, 203-224. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019781109676
Saurina, J. (2009). Dynamic Provisioning. The experience of Spain. Crisis Response. Public Policy for the Private Sector. Note Number 7. Washington D. C., USA: The World Bank.
Sapienza, P. (2004). The effects of government ownership on bank lending. Journal of Financial Economics, 72, 357-384. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2002.10.002
Suarez, O. (2015). ¿Es neutral la información sobre resultados? Revista de Contabilidad-Spanish Accounting Review, 19 (2), 204-215. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rcsar.2015.09.001
Stiroh, K. J., & Strahan, P. E. (2003). Competitive Dynamics of Deregulation: Evidence from U.S. Banking. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35(5), 801-828. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3649829
Wang, C., Xie, F., & Xin, X. (2010). Managerial Ownership of Debt and Accounting Conservatism. Available at SSRN:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1703478
Watts, R. (2003). Conservatism in accounting part I: Explanations and implications. Accounting Horizons, 17(3), 207-221. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.414522
Watts, R.L., & Zimmerman, J.L. (1986). Positive Accounting Theory. New Jersey, USA: Prentice Hall.
Derechos de autor 2023 Revista de Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.
Las obras que se publican en esta revista están sujetas a los siguientes términos:
1. Ediciones de la Universidad de Murcia (EDITUM) y ASEPUC conservan los derechos patrimoniales (copyright) de las obras publicadas, y favorece y permite la reutilización de las mismas bajo la licencia de uso indicada en el punto 2.
2. Las obras se publican en la edición electrónica de la revista bajo una licencia de Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional. Permite copiar, distribuir e incluir el artículo en un trabajo colectivo (por ejemplo, una antología), siempre y cuando no exista una finalidad comercial, no se altere ni modifique el artículo y se cite apropiadamente el trabajo original. Esta revista no tiene tarifa por la publicación Open Access. ASEPUC y EDITUM financian los costes de producción y publicación de los manuscritos.
3. Condiciones de auto-archivo. Se permite y se anima a los autores a difundir electrónicamente la versión publicada de sus obras, ya que favorece su circulación y difusión y con ello un posible aumento en su citación y alcance entre la comunidad académica.
