¿Cómo actúan las empresas frente a la dependencia económica del auditor?: el papel del comité de auditoría

How do firms manage the auditor's economic dependence? the role of the audit committee

Autores/as

  • Estíbaliz Biedma López Universidad de Cádiz
  • Emiliano Ruiz Barbadillo Universidad de Cádiz
  • Nieves Gomez Aguilar Universidad de Cádiz
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S1138-4891(11)70023-1
Palabras clave: independencia del auditor, dependencia económica, comité de auditoría, independencia del comité de auditoría, composición del comité de auditoría, mecanismos de gobierno corporativo

Resumen

La dependencia económica del auditor respecto de su cliente es considerada una amenaza para su independencia. El comité de auditoría puede actuar como salvaguarda, sin embargo, es una medida creada por la empresa auditada y de ella depende que cuente con las características necesarias para ser eficaz. Este trabajo analiza si las empresas gradúan el nivel de independencia del comité de auditoría dependiendo del nivel de dependencia económica de su auditor. Aplicando la técnica de datos de panel a una muestra de empresas españolas cotizadas entre los años 1998 y 2005, los resultados confirman la existencia de una relación significativa entre el nivel de independencia del comité de auditoría y el nivel de dependencia económica del auditor, siendo las empresas con auditores menos dependientes las que forman comités más independientes. Estos resultados suponen una importante contribución a la literatura previa en tanto que aportan evidencia sobre la estrategia seguida por las empresas en el diseño conjunto de mecanismos de garantía de la calidad de la información financiera. Asimismo, se han obtenido teniendo en cuenta algunas de las limitaciones metodológicas que han sido señaladas como principales obstáculos en las investigaciones sobre gobierno corporativo, tales como la endogeneidad y la heterogeneidad inobservable.

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Publicado
01-01-2011
Cómo citar
Biedma López, E., Ruiz Barbadillo, E., & Gomez Aguilar, N. (2011). ¿Cómo actúan las empresas frente a la dependencia económica del auditor?: el papel del comité de auditoría : How do firms manage the auditor’s economic dependence? the role of the audit committee. Revista De Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review, 14(1), 87-119. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1138-4891(11)70023-1
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