Capacidad informativa de los resultados contables e inversores institucionales en las juntas
Earnings informativeness and institutional investors on boards
Resumen
Estudiamos el papel de los consejeros que representan a las entidades bancarias y los fondos de inversión en la capacidad informativa de los resultados contables en un entorno con una baja protección de los inversores y con una alta presencia de consejeros institucionales. Los resultados sugieren que el control ejercido por los consejeros que representan los intereses de las entidades bancarias y de los fondos de inversión mejora la protección de los inversores e incrementa la credibilidad de la información contable divulgada. El artículo posee interesantes implicaciones políticas y académicas en el contexto del debate relativo al nivel de implicación de los inversores institucionales en el gobierno corporativo, apuntando la necesidad de que los investigadores tomen en consideración el papel de los inversores institucionales en otros mecanismos de control corporativo, como es el consejo de administración. Contribuimos a la bibliografía mostrando que, en un entorno de débil protección de los accionistas, una de las formas a través de las cuales los inversores institucionales desempeñan un papel de control es mediante su influencia en la calidad de la información contable cuando son, al mismo tiempo, consejeros y accionistas de la empresa.
Descargas
Citas
Ahmed et al., 2006: Earnings informativeness and board of directors composition Corporate Governance: An International Review, (2006), pp. 418-431
Almazan et al., 2005: Active institutional shareholders and costs of monitoring: Evidence from executive compensation Financial Management, 34 (2005), pp. 5-34
Arellano and Bond, 1991: Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations Review of Economic Studies, 58 (1991), pp. 277-297
Arellano and Bover, 1995: Another look at the instrument variable estimation of error-components models Journal of Econometrics, 68 (1995), pp. 29-51
Beasley, 1996: An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud Accounting Review, 71 (1996), pp. 443-465
Bennett et al., 2003: Greener pastures and the impact of dynamic institutional preferences Review of Financial Studies, 16 (2003), pp. 1203-1238
Bhide, 1993: The hidden costs of stock market liquidity Journal of Financial Economics, 34 (1993), pp. 31-51
Blundell and Bond, 1998: Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models Journal of Econometrics, 87 (1998), pp. 115-143
Bona Sánchez et al., 2013: Dominant institutional control and earnings informativeness Revista Española De Financiación Y Contabilidad, 42 (2013), pp. 371-394
Brickley et al., 1988: Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments Journal of Financial Economics, 20 (1988), pp. 267-291
Bushee, 1998: The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior Accounting Review, 73 (1998), pp. 305-333
Cabedo and Beltrán, 2016: Quantity and quality of risk information disclosed by Spanish firms: An analysis in different periods of the economic cycle Revista de Contabilidad – Spanish Accounting Review, 19 (2016), pp. 261-270
Cau and Stacchini, 2010: The certification role of bank directors on corporate boards Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) – Univ. Politecnica Marche – Dept. Economic and Social Sciences, (2010)
Chen et al., 2007: Corporate governance and earnings management: The implications of corporate governance best-practice principles for Taiwanese listed companies Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 3 (2007), pp. 73-105 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pce.13133
Chung et al., 2002: Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management Journal of Corporate Finance, 8 (2002), pp. 29-48
Cornett et al., 2007: The impact of institutional ownership on corporate operating performance Journal of Banking & Finance, 31 (2007), pp. 1771-1794 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.stemcr.2017.12.002
Cravens and Wallace, 2001: A framework for determining the influence of the corporate board of directors in accounting studies Corporate Governance – An International Review, 9 (2001), pp. 2-24
Cuevas-Rodríguez et al., 2012: Has agency theory run its course?: Making the theory more flexible to inform the management of reward systems Corporate Governance (Oxford), 20 (2012), pp. 526-546
Elyasiani et al., 2010: Institutional ownership stability and the cost of debt Journal of Financial Markets, 13 (2010), pp. 475-500
Fama, 1985: What's different about banks? Journal of Monetary Economics, (1985),
Fama and Jensen, 1983: Separation of ownership and control The Journal of Law and Economics, (1983),
Fan and Wong, 2002: Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33 (2002), pp. 401-425
Ferreira and Matos, 2008: The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional investors around the world Journal of Financial Economics, 88 (2008), pp. 499-533
Francis et al., 2005: Earnings and dividend informativeness when cash flow rights are separated from voting rights Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39 (2005), pp. 329-360
Froot et al., 1992: Herd on the street: Informational inefficiencies in a market with short-term speculation Journal of Finance, 47 (1992), pp. 1461-1484
García-Meca et al., 2015: Institutional Investors on boards: Does the behavior influence corporate finance? Journal of Business Ethics Journal of Business Ethics, (2015), pp. 1-18
García-Osma and Gill de Albornoz-Noguer, 2007: The effect of the board composition and its monitoring committees on earnings management: Evidence from Spain Governance: An International Review, (2007), pp. 1413-1428
Graves and Waddock, 1990: Institutional ownership and control: Implications for long-term corporate strategy Academy of Management Executive, 4 (1990), pp. 75-83
Hadi, 1992: Identifying multiple outliers in multivariate data Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Methodological), 54 (1992), pp. 761-771
Hadlock and James, 2002: Do banks provide financial slack? Journal of Finance, 57 (2002), pp. 1383-1419
Hartzell and Starks, 2003: Institutional investors and executive compensation The Journal of Finance, LVIII (2003), pp. 2351-2374
Heidrick and Struggles, 2011: Challenging board performance European Report on Corporate Governance, (2011),
Imhoff and Lobo, 1992: The effect of ex ante earnings uncertainty on earnings response coefficients Accounting Review, 67 (1992), pp. 427-439
Koh, 2003: On the association between institutional ownership and aggressive corporate earnings management in Australia The British Accounting Review, 35 (2003), pp. 105-128
Koh, 2007: Institutional investor type, earnings management and benchmark beaters Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 26 (2007), pp. 267-299
La Porta et al., 1999: Corporate ownership around the world Journal of Finance, 54 (1999), pp. 471-517
Lee, 2007: Corporate voluntary disclosure and the separation of cash flow rights from control rights Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 28 (2007), pp. 393-416
Lobo and Yang, 2001: Bank managers’ heterogeneous decisions on discretionary loan loss provisions Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 16 (2001), pp. 223-250
López-Iturriaga and Tejerina-Gaite, 2014: A primer on corporate governance Business Expert Press, (2014)
López-Iturriaga et al., 2015: Institutional Investors and board compensation: Spanish evidence. Business Research Quarterly Business Research Quarterly, 18 (2015), pp. 161-173
Martín et al., 2007: Estructura de propiedad y capacidad informativa de los resultados contables Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting/Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad, Routledge, 36 (2007), pp. 55-72
Monks and Minow, 2011: Corporate governance 5th ed., Wiley, (2011)
Park and Shin, 2004: Board composition and earnings management in Canada Journal of Corporate Finance, 10 (2004), pp. 431-457
Peasnell et al., 2005: Board monitoring and earnings management: Do outside directors influence abnormal accruals? Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 32 (2005), pp. 1311-1346
Petra, 2007: The effects of corporate governance on the informativeness of earnings Economics of Governance, 8 (2007), pp. 129-152
Pucheta-Martinez and Garcia-Meca, 2014: Institutional investors on boards and audit committees and their effects on financial reporting quality Corporate Governance – An International Review, 22 (2014), pp. 347-363
Pugliese et al., 2009: Boards of directors’ contribution to strategy: A literature review and research agenda Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17 (2009), pp. 292-306
Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012: Institutional ownership and conservatism Journal of Accounting and Economics, 53 (2012), pp. 98-114
Roodman, 2009: How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata Stata Journal, 9 (2009), pp. 86-136
Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca, 2007: Ownership structure, discretionary accruals and the informativeness of earnings Corporate Governance, 15 (2007), pp. 677-691
Scott, 1997: Financial accounting theory Upper Saddle River, (1997)
Siregar and Utama, 2008: Type of earnings management and the effect of ownership structure, firm size, and corporate-governance practices: Evidence from Indonesia International Journal of Accounting, 43 (2008), pp. 1-27
Struggles, 2011: Challenging board performance, European Corporate Governance Report 2011 (2011) Available at: http://www.heidrick.com/PublicationsReports/PublicationsReports/HS_EuropeanCorpGovRpt2011.pdf
Studenmund, 2006: Using econometrics: A practical guide. Addison-Wesley series in economics Addison Wesley Longman, (2006)
Teoh and Wong, 1993: Perceived earnings auditor response quality and the coefficient The Accounting Review, 68 (1993), pp. 346-366
Wang, 2014: Which types of institutional investors constrain abnormal accruals? Corporate Governance (Oxford), 22 (2014), pp. 43-67
Warfield et al., 1995: Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings Journal of Accounting and Economics, (1995),
Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998: On the costs of a bank-centered financial system: Evidence from the changing main bank relations in Japan The Journal of Finance, 3 (1998), pp. 635-672
Wooldridge, 2002: Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data The MIT Press, (2002)
Yeo et al., 2002: Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of earnings Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 29 (2002), pp. 1023-1046 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/bs8010008
Las obras que se publican en esta revista están sujetas a los siguientes términos:
1. Ediciones de la Universidad de Murcia (EDITUM) y ASEPUC conservan los derechos patrimoniales (copyright) de las obras publicadas, y favorece y permite la reutilización de las mismas bajo la licencia de uso indicada en el punto 2.
2. Las obras se publican en la edición electrónica de la revista bajo una licencia de Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional. Permite copiar, distribuir e incluir el artículo en un trabajo colectivo (por ejemplo, una antología), siempre y cuando no exista una finalidad comercial, no se altere ni modifique el artículo y se cite apropiadamente el trabajo original. Esta revista no tiene tarifa por la publicación Open Access. ASEPUC y EDITUM financian los costes de producción y publicación de los manuscritos.
3. Condiciones de auto-archivo. Se permite y se anima a los autores a difundir electrónicamente la versión publicada de sus obras, ya que favorece su circulación y difusión y con ello un posible aumento en su citación y alcance entre la comunidad académica.
