Brecha salarial de los directores ejecutivos y riesgo bancario: evidencia de bancos comerciales que cotizan en bolsa en China
CEO Pay Gap and Bank Risk: Evidence from Listed Commercial Banks in China
Agencias de apoyo
- Project “Research on Financial Services to Promote High-Quality Development of Private Enterprises in Liaoning Province” (Project No. 2025lslybwzzkt-073) sponsored by Liaoning Federation of Social Sciences
- Project “Research on the Impact of ESG Evaluation on Enterprise Financial Performance" sponsored by China Association of Chief Financial Officers
Resumen
Este artículo investiga la influencia de la brecha salarial del director ejecutivo (CEO) sobre el riesgo bancario en un contexto distinto de gobierno corporativo donde la remuneración del CEO se limita exclusivamente a un salario en efectivo más una bonificación. Una muestra de 37 bancos chinos que cotizan en bolsa entre 2010 y 2022 utiliza un modelo de regresión de efectos fijos. De acuerdo con la teoría del torneo, los autores conjeturan que la brecha salarial de los CEO (CPG), medida por la brecha salarial (PGAP) y la porción salarial de los CEO (CPS), está significativa y positivamente asociada con el riesgo bancario, medido por la inversa z- puntaje. Los resultados revelan heterogeneidad, con un notable efecto positivo evidente en los subconjuntos de bancos grandes y no estatales. Los resultados del estudio se han validado ampliamente mediante varias comprobaciones de solidez, incluidas medidas alternativas de la GPC, el riesgo bancario, el enfoque 2SLS-IV y excluyendo el período COVID-19. El documento tiene implicaciones importantes para sistemas únicos de gobierno corporativo, como los que prevalecen en el sistema bancario chino, donde los resultados pueden informar e influir en las prácticas corporativas y las decisiones regulatorias.
Descargas
Citas
Abdelbadie, R. A., & Salama, A. (2019). Corporate governance and financial stability in US banks: Do indirect interlocks matter? Journal of Business Research, 104, 85-105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.06.047
Ali, S., Iqbal, J., Malik, I., & Rahman, D. (2024). Does managerial pay disparity influence BHC default risk? International Review of Economics & Finance, 92, 1250-1269. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2024.02.032
Bae, K.-H., Gong, Z., & Tong, W. H. S. (2024). Restricting CEO pay backfires: Evidence from China. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 51(5-6), 1015-1045. https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12741
Bai, G., & Elyasiani, E. (2013). Bank stability and managerial compensation. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(3), 799-813. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.10.026
Baker, G. P., Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1988). Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory. The Journal of Finance, 43(3), 593-616. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04593.x
Banker, R. D., Bu, D., & Mehta, M. N. (2016). Pay Gap and Performance in China. Abacus, 52(3), 501-531. https://doi.org/10.1111/abac.12082
Bebchuk, L. A., Cremers, K. M., & Peyer, U. C. (2011). The CEO pay slice. Journal of Financial Economics, 102(1), 199-221. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.006
Boateng, A., Nguyen, V. H. T., Du, M., & Kwabi, F. O. (2022). The impact of CEO compensation and excess reserves on bank risk-taking: the moderating role of monetary policy. Empirical Economics, 62(4), 1575-1598. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-021-02086-4
Bolton, P., Mehran, H., & Shapiro, J. (2015). Executive Compensation and Risk Taking. Review of Finance, 19(6), 2139-2181. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfu049
Bu, D., Zhang, C., & Lin, T. (2016). Will political promotion expectation decrease the pay gap in state-owned enterprises in China? China Journal of Accounting Studies, 4(1), 53–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/21697213.2016.1144969
Byrd, J., Cooperman, E. S., & Wolfe, G. A. (2010). Director tenure and the compensation of bank CEOs. Managerial Finance, 36(2), 86-102. https://doi.org/10.1108/03074351011014523
Chen, C. R., Steiner, T. L., & Whyte, A. M. (2006). Does stock option-based executive compensation induce risk-taking? An analysis of the banking industry. Journal of Banking & Finance, 30(3), 915-945. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.06.004
Chen, J., Ezzamel, M., & Cai, Z. (2011). Managerial power theory, tournament theory, and executive pay in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(4), 1176-1199. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.008
Chen, Z., Huang, Y., & Wei, J. (2013). Executive pay disparity and the cost of equity capital. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 48(3), 849-885. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43303824
Chen, S., Ma, H., & Bu, D. (2014). Board affiliation and pay gap. China Journal of Accounting Research, 7(2), 81-100. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2014.03.001
Chizema, A., Liu, X., Lu, J., & Gao, L. (2015). Politically connected boards and top executive pay in Chinese listed firms. Strategic Management Journal, 36(6), 890-906. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2253
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2006). Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal of financial economics, 79(2), 431-468. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.004
Conyon, M. J., & He, L. (2011). Executive compensation and corporate governance in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(4), 1158-1175. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006
Crawford, K. (2021). The atlas of AI: Power, politics, and the planetary costs of artificial intelligence: Yale University Press. https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300264630/atlas-of-ai/
DeYoung, R., Peng, E. Y., & Yan, M. (2013). Executive compensation and business policy choices at U.S. commercial banks. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 48(1), 165-196. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109012000646
Ding, S., Jia, C., Wilson, C., & Wu, Z. (2015). Political connections and agency conflicts: the roles of owner and manager political influence on executive compensation. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 45(2), 407-434. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-014-0441-9
Duan, Y., El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O., Li, H., & Li, X. (2021). Bank systemic risk around COVID-19: A cross-country analysis. Journal of Banking & Finance, 133, 106299. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106299
Ehrenberg, R. G., & Bognanno, M. L. (1990). Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects? Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), 1307-1324. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261736
Ellul, A., & Yerramilli, V. (2013). Stronger risk controls, lower risk: evidence from U.S. bank holding companies. The Journal of Finance, 68(5), 1757-1803. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12057
Fahlenbrach, R., & Stulz, R. M. (2011). Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 99(1), 11-26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.010
Goel, A. M., & Thakor, A. V. (2008). Overconfidence, CEO selection, and corporate governance. The Journal of Finance, 63, 2737-2784. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01412.x
Guo, L., Jalal, A., & Khaksari, S. (2015). Bank executive compensation structure, risk-taking and the financial crisis. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 45(3), 609-639. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-014-0449-1
Han, F., Che, X., & He, E. (2022). Impact of pay disparities between chief executive officers and chief financial officers on corporate financial and investment policies. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 33(1), 57-82. https://doi.org/10.1111/jifm.12142
Hu, F., Pan, X., & Tian, G. (2013). Does CEO pay dispersion matter in an emerging market? Evidence from China's listed firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 24, 235-255. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2013.07.003
Huang, Q. (2023). Executive compensation and bank risk in China. Economics and Business Letters, 12(1), 62-67. https://doi.org/10.17811/ebl.12.1.2023.62-67
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
Jia, N. (2018). Tournament incentives and stock price crash risk. Accounting Horizons, 32(3), 101–121. https://doi.org/10.2308/acch-52120
Jiang, Y., Yuan, C., & Zhang, J. (2023). Does executive compensation mechanism balance performance with risk-taking? Evidence from China's banking system. Kybernetes. https://doi.org/10.1108/K-09-2022-1251
Jiao, A., Sun, R., & Liu, C. (2024). Restricting Pay Gap Backfires: The Case of Bank Misconduct. Finance Research Letters, 61, 104981. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2024.104981
Jin, Z., Li, Y., & Liang, S. (2023). Confucian culture and executive compensation: Evidence from China. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 31(1), 33-54. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12434
Kale, J. R., Reis, E., & Venkateswaran, A. (2009). Rank-Order Tournaments and Incentive Alignment: The Effect on Firm Performance. The Journal of Finance, 64(3), 1479-1512. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01470.x
Kashyap, A., Rajan, R., & Stein, J. (2008). Rethinking capital regulation. Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, 431-471. https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedkpr:00014
Keeley, M. C. (1990). Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking. The American Economic Review, 80(5), 1183-1200. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2006769
Kini, O., & Williams, R. (2012). Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 103(2), 350-376. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.09.005
Kolm, J., Laux, C., & Lóránth, G. (2016). Bank regulation, CEO compensation, and boards. Review of Finance, 21(5), 1901-1932. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfw046
Kong, G., Huang, J., & Ma, G. (2023). Anti-corruption and within-firm pay gap: Evidence from China. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 79, 102041. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2023.102041
Kubick, T. R., & Masli, A. N. S. (2016). Firm-level tournament incentives and corporate tax aggressiveness. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 35(1), 66-83. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2015.08.002
Laeven, L., & Levine, R. (2009). Bank governance, regulation and risk-taking. Journal of Financial Economics, 93(2), 259-275. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.09.003
Lambert, R. A., Larcker, D. F., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1991). Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation. Journal of Accounting Research, 29(1), 129-149. https://doi.org/10.2307/2491032
Lazear, E. P., & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 841-864. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1830810
Lee, C.-C., Wang, Y., & Zhang, X. (2023). Corporate governance and systemic risk: Evidence from Chinese-listed banks. International Review of Economics & Finance, 87, 180-202. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2023.04.023
Luo, Y. (2015). CEO power, ownership structure, and pay performance in Chinese banking. Journal of Economics and Business, 82, 3-16. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2015.04.003
Méndez, C., Pathan, S., & Durand, R. (2024). Do women directors impact the cost of bank financing? Evidence from Australia. Revista de Contabilidad-Spanish Accounting Review, 27, 110-129. https://doi.org/10.6018/rcsar.478341
Ongena, S., Savaşer, T., & Şişli Ciamarra, E. (2022). CEO incentives and bank risk over the business cycle. Journal of Banking & Finance, 138, 106460. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106460
Pathan, S. (2009). Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(7), 1340-1350. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.02.001
Pathan, S., Haq, M., & Morgan, J. (2023). CEO Pay Gaps and Bank Risk-Taking. European Accounting Review, 32(4), 935-964. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2043761
Phan, H. V., Simpson, T., & Nguyen, H. T. (2017). Tournament-Based Incentives, Corporate Cash Holdings, and the Value of Cash. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 52(4), 1519-1550. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109017000503
Roy, A. D. (1952). Safety First and the Holding of Assets. Econometrica, 20(3), 431-449. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907413
Ryan, H. E., & Wiggins, R. A. (2001). The influence of firm- and manager-specific characteristics on the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7(2), 101-123. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(00)00021-3
Talavera, O., Yin, S., & Zhang, M. (2021). Tournament incentives, age diversity and firm performance. Journal of Empirical Finance, 61, 139-162. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2021.01.003
Xu, J., & Zou, L. (2019). The impact of CEO pay and its disclosure on stock price crash risk: evidence from China. China Finance Review International, 9(4), 479-497. https://doi.org/10.1108/CFRI-10-2018-0138
Wang, W., He, L., Ma, J., & Chang, C. P. (2024). Executive compensation, equity structure and risk-taking in Chinese banks. Economic Change and Restructuring, 57(3), 124. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10644-024-09701-1
Wu, S., Zhu, J., & Wu, T. (2025). The impact of CEO founder and CEO age on new ventures performance: A quantile regression analysis for US IPOs. Revista de Contabilidad-Spanish Accounting Review, 28(1), 3-17. https://revistas.um.es/rcsar/article/view/553941/379201
Derechos de autor 2025 Revista de Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.
Las obras que se publican en esta revista están sujetas a los siguientes términos:
1. Ediciones de la Universidad de Murcia (EDITUM) y ASEPUC conservan los derechos patrimoniales (copyright) de las obras publicadas, y favorece y permite la reutilización de las mismas bajo la licencia de uso indicada en el punto 2.
2. Las obras se publican en la edición electrónica de la revista bajo una licencia de Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional. Permite copiar, distribuir e incluir el artículo en un trabajo colectivo (por ejemplo, una antología), siempre y cuando no exista una finalidad comercial, no se altere ni modifique el artículo y se cite apropiadamente el trabajo original. Esta revista no tiene tarifa por la publicación Open Access. ASEPUC y EDITUM financian los costes de producción y publicación de los manuscritos.
3. Condiciones de auto-archivo. Se permite y se anima a los autores a difundir electrónicamente la versión publicada de sus obras, ya que favorece su circulación y difusión y con ello un posible aumento en su citación y alcance entre la comunidad académica.
