Corporate governance and financial reporting quality
Gobierno corporativo y deficiencias de la información contable
Abstract
Based on listed Spanish companies, the paper evidences corporate governance and ownership relation to financial reporting quality. The results of univariate analysis show significant differences in governance-management separation and ownership concentration between firms with and without deficiencies. The multivariante regression finds reporting quality negative and significant related to governance-management separation and positive related to ownership concentration. Financial position is worse in firms with reporting deficiencies.
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