El impacto económico de los fallos de auditoría
The economic impact of audit failures
Agencias de apoyo
- Consellería de Educació, Cultura i Esport de la Generalitat Valenciana under the Grant VALi d (Resolution 26 June 2014)
- Grant GV/2021/092 by Conselleria de Innovación, Universidades, Science and Digital Society (Subsidies to Emerging Research Groups, Programme for the Emerging Research Groups, Programme for the Promotion of Scientific Research, Technological Scientific Research, Technological Development and Innovation in the in the CV, DOGV 8959 of 24 November 2020, Resolution 5 March 2021)
Resumen
Este trabajo examina las consecuencias económicas asociadas a un fallo de auditoría en el ámbito de los servicios de auditoría legal, analizando los cambios en la cuota de mercado de la firma de auditoría en torno al momento del proceso de investigación emprendido por el Consejo de Supervisión Pública español.
Exploramos las variaciones en la cuota de mercado de la auditoría aplicando el método de diferencia en diferencias a un grupo de tratamiento de 70 firmas de auditoría sancionadas y a un grupo de control emparejado de 70 firmas de auditoría no sancionadas. El periodo de análisis abarca los años comprendidos entre 1999 y 2015. Nuestros resultados muestran que las firmas de auditoría sancionadas sufrieron un descenso significativo en su número relativo de clientes. Además, esta medida de la cuota de mercado disminuyó no sólo después de la publicación de la comunicación de la sanción (lo que puede atribuirse a las pérdidas de reputación), sino también después del inicio de la investigación (lo que puede atribuirse a la reticencia de la empresa a auditar clientes de riesgo). Los resultados son similares tanto para las pequeñas como para las grandes empresas cuando la cuota de mercado se mide en términos de clientes, mientras que la evidencia es débil en lo que respecta a las variaciones de su cuota de mercado basada en el volumen de negocio. Nuestras conclusiones podrían ser de interés para las firmas de auditoría y también para los reguladores de la auditoría a la hora de diseñar sistemas disciplinarios.
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